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LIFE OF  
MOHAMMED ALI





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**LIFE OF MOHAMMED ALI.**









MOHAMMED ALI.



LONDON

E. CHURTON, 26, HOLLES STREET.

1840

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THE LIFE  
OF  
MOHAMMED ALI,  
Viceroy of Egypt.

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TO WHICH ARE APPENDED,

THE QUADRUPLE TREATY

AND

THE OFFICIAL MEMORANDA OF THE ENGLISH AND  
FRENCH MINISTERS.



E. CHURTON, 26, HOLLES STREET, LONDON,  
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
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**HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS.**



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THE  
LIFE OF MOHAMMED ALI.

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EGYPT, if not the parent, may with truth be regarded the foster-mother of science; it cherished the intellectual germ of early times, and the offshoots which sprung and spread therefrom may be justly esteemed the first roots of Grecian learning. It was the fountain-head of philosophy, the source of wisdom; and after all its windings and enlargements we may still trace the stream of our knowledge to the banks of the Nile. In the days of antiquity, this celebrated region was the connecting link between India and Greece, as it is now between Africa and Asia, forming one of the portals to that hitherto impenetrable portion of the old continent. Its crumbling monuments, its physical features, its geographical position, its proverbial fertility, its commercial importance, combine to render the "land of Egypt" in the eyes of the scientific traveller, the statesman, and the philanthropist, the most attractive portion of the eastern world.

Egypt, Mizr or Mizraim in Hebrew, Masr in Arabic, and Chamî or Chemî in Coptic, is generally reckoned within the limits of Africa, although several geographers have considered it as physically belonging to Asia. It is bounded on the north by the Mediterranean, on the east by the little river of El Arish, on the borders of Palestine and the Syrian or Arabian desert, which extends from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Suez, and thence southwards by the west coast of the Red Sea, and on the west by the Libyan desert. To the south its boundary from the oldest time has been fixed at the rapids or cataracts of Assouan, the ancient Syene, which are formed by a number of granite rocks that lie across the bed of the river. But the political limits of Egypt have extended both in ancient and modern times further south along the valley of the Nile into the country known by the general name of Nubia. The length of Egypt from the cataracts of Syene  $24^{\circ} 8'$  N. lat. to the most northern points of the Delta on the Mediterranean  $31^{\circ} 25'$ , measures on the map about 500 English miles. The length, however, of the cultivated parts of Egypt, or valley of the Nile, is considerably greater, owing to the numerous bends of the river, which give it a course of about 500 miles from Assouan to a few miles north of Kahira or Cairo, where the valley terminates: this estimate is exclu-

sive of the length of the Delta, which is nearly 100 miles more. The breadth of Egypt is difficult to determine. As to its physical boundaries, it may be considered to extend from the shores of the Red Sea to the range of hills which bound the valley of the Nile to the west; it may even be extended over the western desert as far as the Oases which are dependencies of Egypt; or it may be restricted to the breadth of the cultivated land in the valley of the Nile and Delta, which are the only parts, excepting the Oases, where there is a settled population.

The present dominions of the ruler of Egypt reach on one side to Sennaar and Kordofan, and on the other over all Syria to Adana, a part of Cilicia, at the foot of Mount Taurus. The Pasha likewise possesses the fine island of Candia. In Arabia, he is protector of Mecca and Medina, and lord of the Hedjaz; and enjoys at least as extensive a tract of country as any of his predecessors of the Fatimite, Ptolemaic, or Pharaoh dynasties. His power is founded on a strong military force, consisting of between fifty and sixty thousand regular troops, the officers of which are mostly proud Osmanlees, aliens to Egypt, and the soldiers are the sons of the poor, oppressed, despised Fellahs. No Arab officer, says Planat, is raised above the rank of lieutenant. The Osmanlees fill likewise the principal offices of the government. But

the native Egyptians are said to be quick at learning, hardy, frugal, and persevering; they make excellent soldiers; they divest themselves of old prejudices more easily than the Turks, and in their intercourse with Europeans they exhibit none of the jealousy and pride of the latter. Whatever therefore may be the consequence of Mohammed Ali's reforms, with regard to the stability of his dynasty, there is some reason to hope that the impulse which he has given to the native population will not be in vain, and that the seeds of improvement scattered thus throughout Egypt, will spread and fructify in the fullness of time over other parts of the Arab world, of which Egypt forms so central and so important a portion.

Without entering on the history of Egypt as an independent kingdom, which would occupy far more space than our confined limits permit, we shall commence with the period of its conversion into a province of the Turkish empire, in the year 1517, when Selim I., the Ottoman sultan, defeated the Mamelukes\* at the battle of Heliopolis, and caused

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\* The Mamelukes were originally a body of Turkish slaves, who had gradually acquired authority at the Egyptian court. When Saladin usurped the sovereignty of Egypt, he durst not entrust himself to the national troops, but placed about his throne a powerful body-guard of Tartar slaves, whom the Moguls had acquired in war, and sold into bondage. Successive sultans increased the power of these attendants by new privileges; and upon the death of Nojmoddin, they had in reality the disposal of the sovereign



Toman Bey, the last of their kings, to be hanged at Cairo. Selim abolished the dynasty, but not the aristocracy of the Mamelukes; he even entered into a regular treaty with them, in which he acknowledged Egypt as a republic, governed by twenty-four Mameluke beys, tributary to him and his successors, who appointed a pasha, or governor, to reside at Cairo.

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power, and eventually attained it. "The Mamelukes," says Sir Walter Scott, "were at the period of the French invasion a corps of professed soldiers, having no trade excepting war. In this they resemble the Janissaries, the Strelitzes, the Prætorian bands, or similar military bodies, which constituting a standing army under a despotic government, are alternately the protectors and the terror of the sovereign, who is their nominal commander. But the peculiar feature of the constitution of the Mamelukes was, that their corps was recruited only by the adoption of foreign slaves, particularly Georgians and Circassians. These were purchased when children by the several beys or Mameluke leaders, who, twenty-four in number, occupied each one of the twenty-four departments into which they had divided Egypt. The youthful slave, purchased with a heedful reference to his strength and personal appearance, was carefully trained to arms in the family of his master. When created a Mameluke, he was received into the troop of the bey, and rendered capable of succeeding to him at his death; for these chiefs despised the ordinary connexions of blood, and their authority was, upon military principles, transferred at their death to him amongst the band who was accounted the best soldier. They fought always on horseback, and in their peculiar mode of warfare they might be termed, individually considered, the finest cavalry in the world. Completely armed, and unboundedly confident in their own prowess, they were intrepid, skilful, and formidable in war; but with their military bravery began and ended the catalogue of their virtues. Their vices were un pitying cruelty, habitual oppression, and the unlimited exercise of the most gross and disgusting sensuality."

This pasha, however, was to make no alterations in the system of government without the consent of the beys, who might even suspend him from his functions if he acted arbitrarily, until the pleasure of the Porte should be known. The beys were to elect from their own body a *Sheikh-el-belled*, or governor of the city, who was looked upon by the Porte as the chief of the republic. In time of war Egypt was to send 12,000 men to join the Ottoman armies. In other respects the republic, that is to say, the Mameluke aristocracy, was to enjoy absolute power over the inhabitants of Egypt, levy taxes, keep a military force, raise money, and exercise all the rights of sovereignty.

This treaty was signed in the year 887 of the Hegira, A.D. 1517. (Savary, *Lettres sur l'Egypte*, vol. ii.) Under this form of government Egypt remained nominally subject to the Porte, against whose authority the Mamelukes often openly revolted, till the French invasion of 1798, when Buonaparte, under the pretence of delivering Egypt from their yoke, took possession of the country. The English sent an expedition in 1801 to aid the Porte, which drove away the French, and restored the pasha appointed by the Sultan.

The present natives of Egypt consist of, 1. The *Copts*, the supposed descendants of the ancient Egyptians, and more certainly the feeble remnant of a once numerous Christian population. 2. The Fellahs, who

compose the bulk of the labouring class, and who are supposed to be a mixture of ancient Egyptians, Arabians, and Syrians: they are rigid Moslems. 3. The Bedouin Arabs,—the same in character, manners, and customs that they are everywhere, and apparently ever have been, since the days of the Patriarchs: regarding with disdain and proud independence all other classes of mankind, but more especially those of their own nation who have degraded themselves by taking up their abodes within walls. 4. Arabian Greeks; that is, the descendants of the ancient Greek colonists, who have lost their ancient language, and speak a kind of Arabic. Many of them are mariners; but, in general, they pursue the inferior and handicraft trades. 5. Jews.—To these must be added, as inhabitants of Egypt, 6. Syrians, Greeks, and Maronites, who have, within the last century, greatly increased in number, and have proved successful rivals of the Copts and Jews, as merchants and agents. 7. Armenians. 8. Turks. 9. Franks. 10. Mamelukes. 11. Mogrebins or Western Arabs. 12. Ethiopians and other Africans. To ascertain the respective numbers of these different divisions of the population, with any precision, is next to impossible; but the following may be regarded, perhaps, as a sufficient approximation, to give some idea of their relative proportion:—



Copts . . . . .	160,000.
Arab Fellahs . . . . .	2,250,000.
Arabian Greeks . . . . .	25,000.
Bedouin Arabs . . . . .	150,000.
Jews . . . . .	20,000.
Syrians . . . . .	20,000.
Armenians . . . . .	10,000.
Turks and Albanians . . . .	20,000.
Franks . . . . .	4,000.
Mamelukes . . . . .	500.
Ethiopians . . . . .	7,500.*

Over this heterogeneous mass of men, amounting to probably three millions of souls, the sceptre is now wielded by one of the most extraordinary persons to be found in Mohammedan history—one, whose imposing address, restless activity, enterprising spirit, and above all, whose superiority to national and religious prejudices, justly entitled to be regarded amongst the most energetic—the greatest Moslem princes that ever fought for, and achieved that summit of ambition—sovereign rule.

MOHAMMED ALI was born at Cavalla, in Roumelia, a district of Albania, in the year 1769 † (of the Hegira, 1182), the son of Ibrahim Aga, chief of the guard for the security of the public roads‡. Losing

\* These details are taken from Conder's *Modern Traveller*.

† 1769 was productive of distinguished men. Napoleon, Wellington, and Mohammed Ali, were all born in that year.

‡ In a conversation which Mr. Barker, late British Consul General in Egypt, held with Mohammed Ali, the Pasha, Mr. Barker relates, concluded by observing, "I will tell you a story; I

his father in early life, he was taken into the house of the governor of Cavalla, and commenced his fortunate career by assisting his patron in collecting the taxes. On one occasion the inhabitants of a village refused payment, and rose in rebellion ; but Mohammed, at the head of a few men, hastily equipped, soon checked the spirit of insubordination which had arisen. This resolute step procured for him the rank of a *boulouk-bashi*, and a rich wife, a relation of his patron, the governor, by whom he had three sons, IBRAHIM, TOUSSOUN, and ISMAEL. With the aid of the money thus acquired, and by means of his family connexions, Mohammed became a dealer in tobacco, a business which he continued to pursue with some success, until

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was born in a village in Albania, and my father had ten children, besides me, who are all dead ; but, while living, not one of them ever contradicted me. Although I left my native mountains before I attained to manhood, the principal people in the place never took any step in the business of the commune, without previously inquiring what was my pleasure. I came to this country an obscure adventurer, and when I was yet but a *Bimbashi* (captain), it happened one day that the commissary had to give each of the *Bimbashis* a tent. They were all my seniors, and naturally pretended to a preference over me ; but the officer said,—‘ Stand you all by ; this youth, Mohammed Ali, shall be served first.’ And I *was* served first ; and I advanced step by step, as it pleased God to ordain ; and now here I am.”—(rising a little on his seat, and looking out of the window which was at his elbow, and commanded a view of the Lake Mareotis)—“ and now here I am. I never had a master,”—(glancing his eye at the roll containing the *Imperial firman*).

an event occurred which called him to fulfil a higher destiny. On the invasion of Egypt by the French, the governor of Cavalla was required by the Porte to furnish his contingent, amounting to 300 men; the command of which he gave his son, with whom Mohammed was sent as a kind of Mentor. The young man however, disgusted with the service, soon after landing in Egypt quitted the army, and returned home, leaving the direction of his contingent to Mohammed, who thereupon assumed the title of *bimbashi*. In the first battle in which he was engaged against the division of the French, under General Lagrange, he lost the greater part of his men; but his spirited conduct attracted the attention of the Capitan Pasha, who selected him to head an attack upon the fort in which the French had posted themselves. During the night he succeeded in getting within the intrenchments, ready to storm as soon as the daylight should appear; but in the morning it was discovered that the French had evacuated the works. This bloodless enterprise raised him, however, another step. In the subsequent campaign against the Mamelukes, the viceroy, Koursouf Pasha, gave Mohammed the command of a division under Yousef Bey, who, being completely beaten, accused his officer of misconduct or disaffection. The Viceroy, exasperated, determined to send Mohammed into exile, and with this intention, ordered

him to appear before him at night; but Mohammed, not unacquainted with the object of such private interviews, in answer, demanded pay for himself and his soldiers, adding, that he would wait upon him with his troops next morning, in broad daylight. A few days afterwards the Viceroy was himself driven from the capital by the Albanians, under Taher Pasha, who for a short time assumed the reins of government; but on his inviting the Mamelukes into Cairo, he was assassinated by the Turks. From that moment Mohammed Ali commenced a series of intrigues with the Turks, the Mamelukes, and Albanians, making each and all of them alternately his instruments, either as allies, or enemies, as best suited his ulterior views, but always using his influence, and generally with success, in appeasing sedition. For his services in this respect, he was rewarded by an imperial firman with the dignity of PASHA. The whole army was at this time deeply in arrears of pay, and Khourschid, the new Viceroy, had made himself universally unpopular by his exactions. What share Mohammed Ali had in fomenting this dissatisfaction does not appear; but so it happened, or was contrived, that the people, headed by the *Sheikhs*, the officers generally, and the army, declared that they would no longer be governed by Khourschid, and called upon Mohammed to be their ruler, entreating him to save



Egypt from rebellion and bloodshed, and to preserve an important province of the Turkish empire. With apparent reluctance he acceded to their urgent solicitations, and proceeded to besiege the Viceroy, who had shut himself up with his followers in the castle of Cairo. In the meanwhile Kourschid endeavoured to strengthen himself by inviting the dangerous assistance of the Mamelukes, and was making preparations to take the field against the wily Albanian, when the Capitan Pasha unexpectedly cast anchor before Alexandria, and forthwith sent orders to the Viceroy to place the citadel into the hands of Mohammed, and to repair, in person, without delay, to his head-quarters on the sea-coast. Kourschid obeyed; and, after a brief period of service in other parts of the Turkish empire, lost his life. But the Sublime Porte, unwilling that any one interest should obtain the ascendancy in Egypt, determined now to support the Mameluke beys, who were about to try the fortune of war against their old enemy, the Albanian chief, and a Capitan Pasha was accordingly despatched, with instructions to assist Elfy Bey in his endeavours to assume the viceregal mantle; but all proved unavailing; and the Sultan, perceiving himself on the eve of a war with Russia, at length forwarded secret orders to the Capitan to make the best terms he could with the usurper, and to leave him in possession of the

viceroyalty. Shortly after, an imperial firman, constituting Mohammed Ali, Viceroy, arrived, and the Pasha found himself master of Egypt. His first step was to march against the Mamelukes, and to attack them in Upper Egypt, where he defeated a large body of their troops, and was preparing to pursue his advantage by their utter annihilation, when he received despatches from Turkey, announcing the commencement of hostilities between the Porte and England.

The unfortunate expedition of the English in 1807, which immediately followed, did Mohammed the service of putting the important port of Alexandria into his hands. There would have been no difficulty in our retaining possession of it, but it was deemed a wise measure to give up the town and harbour to Mohammed Ali, instead of the Porte; his hands thus became strengthened,—commerce flourished, the revenues were augmented, and the general prosperity of the country rapidly advanced by the liberal policy which he continued after the example of the English, and which there is reason to believe, he did the more readily at the recommendation of the English vice-consul. The Pasha's authority was very far, however, from being yet established. A remnant of the Mamelukes still survived; and at once to propitiate the Porte, and to secure his own position, Mohammed

resolved on their extermination—an act as unjustifiable in principle as it was beneficial in consequences.

Jealous of the power of the Mamelukes, and foiled by them in his schemes of ambition, he determined to rid himself, at “one fell swoop,” of the whole body of Egypt’s chivalry. Accordingly, on the 1st of March, 1811, he invited them all to a festival, to be celebrated in the citadel, in honour of the investiture of his favourite son Toussoun, upon whom the dignity of a Pasha of the second order had been conferred. They accepted the invitation, little suspecting the treachery that awaited them. Mohammed received his guests with the greatest affability. They were presented with coffee, and he conversed with them individually with apparent openness of heart and serenity of countenance. The procession was ordered to move from the citadel along a passage cut out in the rock: the Pasha’s troops marching first, followed by the Mameluke corps, mounted on their steeds splendidly caparisoned, and arrayed in their gayest apparel. As soon, however, as they had passed the gate, it was shut behind them, while the opposite end of the defile being also closed, they were caught as it were in a trap, and the whole body, amounting to several hundreds, thus hemmed in on all sides, were exposed to a murderous fire from companies of soldiers concealed in the ram-

parts. The wretched men had neither the means of escape, nor of selling dearly their lives.

“Aussitôt les troupes (says Mengin) eurent ordre d’arrêter partout les Mamlouks : ceux que l’on prenait étaient conduits devant le Kiâya-bey, et décapités à l’instant même. Beaucoup d’individus étrangers à cette scène périrent malgré leur innocence, tant le soldat était animé au carnage. Le cadavre de Chahyn-bey fut traîné çà et là, la corde au cou. La citadelle ressemblait à une arène ensanglantée : les morts mutilés encombraient les passages. On voyait partout des chevaux richement harnachés, étendus à côté de leurs maîtres, des sâys percés de balles, des armes brisées et des vêtemens couverts de sang : toutes ces dépouilles devinrent la proie des soldats. On comptait le matin quatre cent soixante-dix Mamlouks à cheval ; nul d’entre eux n’échappa au massacre.” For several days the greatest alarm and disorder reigned throughout Cairo ; the shops were all closed—the streets deserted. The town had the appearance of a place taken by assault, and robberies and excesses of the most frightful description were committed with impunity, by a lawless soldiery. At length, after no less than 500 houses had been pillaged, Mohammed thought proper to descend from the citadel, and at the head of his guard, and by the adoption of measures of great severity, he succeeded in staying the carnage.



Throughout the provinces the same treacherous measures were pursued by the instructions of the Pasha, and every Mameluke that could be found was put to death.

Mohammed was now free to turn the undivided attention of his ambitious mind to the aspect of affairs in Arabia, whither his son, Toussoun Pasha, had gone to take the command of the army against the Wahabees. Toussoun had already obtained considerable success, and had acquired possession of the city of Medina, the keys of which Mohammed forwarded to the Sultan, with large presents of money, jewels, and other valuable articles. The Pasha now also deemed it time to pay his devotions at the shrine of Mecca, and accordingly made a voyage across the Red Sea. At Jeddah, he was received by the Shereef Ghaleb with all kindness, hospitality, and respect; in return for which, either stimulated by avarice, or by the discovery or suspicion of treachery, he secretly ordered his son Toussoun to seize and convey the Shereef to Cairo, while he plundered his palace of immense treasures, a portion of which he sent to the Porte; but the Divan, displeased at the nefarious transaction, returned its share to Ghaleb, who, however, had been sent to some unhealthy spot, where he sickened and died. The various incidents of the Arabian war are devoid of sufficient interest to merit a minute detail.

Suffice it to observe that the Egyptian forces under Toussoun did not follow up the early successes of the campaign, and were much reduced in number and in spirit when Mohammed Ali himself assumed the command. His presence soon restored confidence, and the victory of Basille opened, at the close of the year 1815, a flattering prospect of ultimate success to the Pasha.

Napoleon's return from Elba recalled Mohammed Ali to Egypt, to oppose any further views the French might project against his pashalic. From the scanty remains of the Mamelukes he had nothing to fear; and their former allies, the Bedouin Arabs, were daily coming in to throw themselves on his clemency. Among the most powerful was Sheik Abon Koraim, who had arrived in Cairo to claim the protection of Ibrahim, in his father's absence, and had brought with him a present of forty-five horses. Mohammed, however, had not the magnanimity to forgive his former foe, and the ill-fated sheik lost his head.

Soon after his return to Egypt, about July 1815, the Pasha attempted to put in execution a cherished project, the training of his troops after the European system, and commenced with those under the command of his youngest son, Ismael. The soldiers murmured and called him Pasha of the Gaiours, and the officers not being better disposed towards their

new duties a mutiny ensued. Mohammed, attended by Abdim Bey, took shelter in the citadel. Cairo was the scene of anarchy and plunder; and although the viceroy succeeded in restoring order, it was with the understanding that the obnoxious regulations should be abandoned. Soon after this the Pasha suffered a grievous affliction by the death of his third son, Toussoun, who fell a victim to the plague, and was succeeded in the command of the army by his brother, Ibrahim. This gallant soldier, who has since played so conspicuous a part in Eastern affairs, soon completely subdued the Wahabees, and returned in triumph to Cairo, on which occasion Mohammed himself received rich presents from the Grand Signor, and compliments on his splendid victories. The viceroy now directed his attention to the south, and resolved on bringing the whole country on each side of the Nile, as far as Sennaar, under his subjection. Accordingly, in June 1820, he sent an army of three thousand men under his son Ismael, who, after some hard fighting, obtained possession of the capital. In the course of the following year, a reinforcement of an equal number of troops arrived, under the command of the Defterdar Bey, (a son-in-law of Mohammed,) and the expedition was perfectly successful; the conquest of the extensive countries, which in the reign of Candace repulsed the formida-

ble legions of Rome, being effected at the expense of not more than 200 soldiers. It proved fatal, however, to the young conqueror, whose general conduct had obtained for him a high character for humanity and good faith.

Ismael fell a victim to the revenge of the sheik of a village on whom he had inflicted a blow. The hut, in which he and his suite had taken up their quarters for the night, was surrounded with dried logs of wood and straw whilst they were asleep, and set on fire. They attempted to force their way out, and killed several of their besiegers, but were eventually overcome by the smoke and heat, and all, excepting one attendant, thus miserably perished. Defterdar Bey devoted twenty thousand heads as a sacrifice to the manes of Ismael.

Mohammed Ali had commenced carrying into execution his plan of remodelling the Egyptian army, immediately after the departure of the Defterdar Bey for Sennaar. For this purpose he ordered a camp to be formed at Esneh, (afterwards removed to Assouan,) where a kind of military school was established, to which he directed all his own Mameluke attendants, as well as those of his principal officers, to repair, appointing one of his most devoted adherents its commandant, and giving him as an



instructor, Monsieur Seve\*, formerly a colonel in the French service, and aide-de-camp to Marshal Ney, who had been recommended to him by the French consul, M. Drovetti.

The position of the camp at Assouan, on the furthest limits of Upper Egypt, was chosen, in order to suit the constitutions of the Blacks, who had been taken prisoners by the army of Sennaar, and who were now formed into regular battalions. To these were added gradually a number of Fellahs or Egyptian Arabs, who either enlisted voluntarily, or were levied by the cachefs of villages. The army was formed on the French model, and divided into regiments of five battalions of 800 men each. This organisation (which has since undergone some modification) was considered as the best calculated for the kind of warfare in which the Egyptian army was, in the first instance, likely to be engaged, each regiment forming as it were a small corps d'armée, that could be employed separately under its own colonel. By this plan also a saving was effected in the staff and superior officers, who in the outset were difficult to be met with, Mohammed Ali soon discovering that the most perfect chiboukdgee oftentimes made but an indifferent chef-de-bataillon.

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\* Colonel Seve is now Solyman Pasha.

In the course of three years six regiments were completed, making an army of twenty thousand men. The soldiers (the drudgery of learning the elements of their profession over) soon took a liking to their new life, which they found was not one of greater labour than that to which they had been brought up; but the Turkish officers regretted much their former *otium cum dignitate*, and adopted their new costume with a very bad grace. Ibrahim Pasha did all in his power to overcome this Mohammedan repugnance to march forward in the road of innovation, himself setting an example of the most perfect submission to the directions of the Frank instructors, and holding out rewards to those who should soonest make themselves masters of European tactics. But prejudice has too strong a hold of the present generation of Turks to be easily shaken, and the instructions of the officers did not keep pace by any means with those of the soldiers.

Seve went through his difficult task with great judgment and perseverance. He studied the different dispositions of his pupils: he talked to them in broken Turkish, laughed at their rich saddles and bridles, and told them how a handful of French infantry had defeated their numerous and brilliant Mameluke cavalry. Once, on the occasion of a platoon firing, a ball whistled past his ear. Without noticing this, "You are a set of awkward fellows," cried he

"prime, and load again—present—fire." No ball was heard to whistle this time. This trait of coolness and self-command won him those proud hearts. They became more familiar, courted his company, and by degrees forgot their prejudices.

When the regiments were pronounced to be in a fit state to take the field, (1824,) one proceeded as before mentioned to relieve the force occupying Sennaar and Cordosan, and another was despatched to reinforce the troops that had been left for the protection of the pashalic of Mecca: the Wahabees having again taken the field, and drawn near the shores of the Red Sea. In this quarter hostilities soon commenced, the Wahabees despising the new levée sent against them, so differently equipped from the splendidly attired troops with whom they had hitherto been engaged, quitted their strong positions, with the intention of surrounding and cutting to pieces these pitiful adversaries. They had soon cause, however, to regret the fiery coursers and gaudy trappings of their old opponents. The Egyptian infantry behaved with great steadiness and gallantry, and obtained a complete victory. Such is the superiority of discipline, however slight, over mere brutal force, however great.\*

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\* Captain Rochfort Scott's very interesting work, "Rambles in Egypt and Candia."

Such was the progress which had been made in the political regeneration of Egypt under its present ruler at the commencement of 1824, and one of the earliest results of which was the Egyptian expedition against the Greeks. Urged by the pressing entreaties of the Sultan, and tempted, perchance, by the promise for his son Ibrahim of the pashalic of the Morea, Mohammed undertook to prop up the tottering empire of the Crescent. With this view, he collected about 17,000 troops at Alexandria, and placed them under the command of Ibrahim, who reached the classic shores of Greece early in the year 1825, and within less than three months made himself master of the fortresses of Old and New Navarin, defeated the Greeks in three general actions, and marched his victorious forces across the Morea to the very gates of Nauplia. The remainder of the year was devoted to the reduction of the Morea; and early in the ensuing spring Ibrahim crossing over to the Roumelia laid siege to Missolonghi, of which he obtained possession after a protracted investment of three months, and at an enormous cost of human life. The history of the siege is well known: the two outposts of Anaholica and Vassiladi were first taken by force, and the garrison, spared by Ibrahim, sent to Arsa. Missolonghi was now closely pressed. The Greeks vainly asked to be allowed to evacuate the place with



arms and baggage. They then, after having undermined part of the town, as a last resource of despair, determined to try and cut their way, sword in hand, through the besiegers' lines. They formed themselves into three columns: the first passed with only the loss of eleven men; the second lost thirty, but the third, being more encumbered with women and children, failed in the attempt, and were driven back to the town, which the Egyptians entered along with them. A dreadful scene of slaughter ensued. The Greeks fought from the windows and from behind the walls for four hours. Several families having retired into the houses undermined, blew themselves up with many of their enemies. The remainder were taken, and those found with arms in their hands were put to death. Missolonghi was nothing but a vast heap of ruins and dead bodies of Christians and Mussulmans mixed together.

The events which followed need not be dwelt upon. Greece again bent to the Mussulmans' yoke, and the Egyptian army, having fulfilled its task in the Morea, was about to be transported to some other part of the theatre of war, when the parties to the triple alliance interfering, the battle of Navarino occurred, and in September 1828, Ibrahim, shorn of his conquests, returned to Egypt.

The war in Syria, which originated in the jealousy

of the Sultan, broke out soon after, and opened a new field of action for the ambition of Mohammed Ali, and the military genius of his son. A quarrel had arisen between the Pasha of Egypt and Abdallah, Pasha of Saida, regarding certain pecuniary transactions, and the protection which Abdallah had afforded to some Arab slaves who had taken refuge in his pashalic. Mohammed, emboldened by the insurrection in Bosnia, and the disturbances in other parts of the empire, of which he is himself accused of being the fomentor, threatened, unless justice were done him, to have recourse to arms, and, by marching on Acre, to inflict chastisement on Abdallah. "To avoid the dilemma," says St. John, "in which such a proceeding would have placed him, and also in some degree to control the movements of his dangerous vassal, the Sultan, fully occupied in suppressing rebellions in the European provinces, appeared to coincide with his views, and sent out the Captain Pasha with a fleet, apparently to act in concert with him. But when the various measures for securing the object of the campaign were arranged, and the fleet had already arrived at Rhodes, news of the suppression of the insurrection in Bosnia—which afterwards proved to be unfounded—relieved the Sultan from his panic. He therefore set the Pasha at defiance, and recalled his fleet. Immediately upon this, though the year was drawing near its

close, and the season most unfavourable for such an undertaking, the Pasha pushed forward all necessary preparations for the expedition; and to the dismay of Mahmood, Ibrahim had already disembarked in Syria, before the imperial messenger, despatched from Constantinople with orders to suspend operations, could arrive at Alexandria. Thus the war, which was to terminate in the dismemberment of the empire and the humiliation of the Sultan, was commenced under imperial auspices."

When the Turkish envoy reached Alexandria, Mohammed affected the utmost deference for the orders of the Divan; but observed that the expedition had sailed, that operations had commenced, and that if his Excellency would tarry awhile, he should shortly bear back to his sovereign the keys of Acre. But the ambassador, an able diplomatist, at once fathoming the ambitious projects of the Pasha, demanded what it was he desired from the Porte. "To keep what I have," replied Mehemet. "In a few days Acre will be mine. If the Sultan consent that I shall keep it, I will stop there; if not, I will take Damascus. There again, if Damascus be granted me, I will stop; but if not, I will take Aleppo. And if the Sultan will not then consent—who knows?—*Allah kerim*—'God is merciful.'” On his return to Constantinople, the envoy counselled Mahmood to concede what the

Pasha required; but, like most faithful counsellors, he grievously offended the Sultan, and was thrown into prison.

It was now evident that the fate of arms must decide between Turkey and its rebellious vassal; but the Sultan, who had by no means anticipated such an event, had to begin his preparations while the Pasha was in fact conquering Syria. Tripoli had already fallen into the possession of the Arabs; Acre was invested; and a battle gained at Zera over Osman Pasha. Still, however, the spring was advancing, and with it the vast efforts of the Sultan to take the field. It became therefore necessary to Mohammed to vigorously urge forward the siege of Acre, and thus gain possession of the key to Egypt on the land side, and the first step towards the subjugation of Syria. This was at length accomplished, (in May 1832,) after a gallant struggle on the part of the Turkish garrison, commanded by the chivalrous Abdallah Pasha. Ibrahim proceeded on his march, and on the 14th June Damascus surrendered, without the semblance of resistance. Thence the Egyptian general advanced against the Turkish forces, which had at length taken the field, and were concentrated at Hamah, where it was understood they had formed an entrenched camp. Having passed the sources of the Orontes, Ibrahim took up his position on the eastern



shore of Lake Tatli Gukul, two hours and a-half south of the plains of Homs, so famous as the scene of many a contest. Here, in ancient times, Zenobia contended with Aurelian, and made her last vigorous efforts against the domination of Rome; and here, too, was now to be fought the first of those battles which were to decide the fate of Syria. On the 7th July, before the army had commenced its march, Ibrahim Aga, commander of the Bedouin cavalry, being encamped in advance of the regular troops, discovered the enemy approaching. They consisted of about twenty-five thousand men, infantry and horse, commanded by the governor of Aleppo, and eight inferior pashas. Ibrahim immediately drew out his troops in order of battle. On the right wing were stationed two regiments of regular cavalry; the infantry, with six pieces of cannon, forming the centre; and other regiments of cavalry, with the redoubtable Bedouin horse, constituting the left wing. The Turks advanced in three columns. The action commenced with vigour and great spirit on both sides; but the fury and impetuosity of the Arabs were an overmatch for their opponents, who were driven with fearful slaughter from the field, their whole tents, ammunition, artillery, and provisions, falling into the hands of the conquerors. The immediate results of this signal victory

were the surrender of Homs and Aleppo, and the occupation by Ibrahim, after another successful battle at Bylan, of Scanderoon and Antioch. After the last defeat, the Ottoman forces fell back in the greatest confusion upon Koniah, which during the whole war had been the point where the Turkish troops had been concentrated; and here the Grand Vizir—who had superseded Hussein Pasha in the command of the army—collected a formidable force in order to march upon Syria. But the ever-active Ibrahim did not await his coming. Forcing the passes of Mount Taurus, he descended into the vast plains of Asia Minor, and advanced by the direct road to Koniah, which was about to give name to a battle of the most momentous importance, fought on the 19th December 1832. The armies first came in contact at Akshehr, the Turkish vanguard encountering a party of the Bedouin cavalry who had been stationed there. The battle was hotly contested, and the Turks displayed a more obstinate valour than on any preceding occasion; a circumstance which may be accounted for by the greater number of regular troops engaged—by the attachment of the soldiers to the Grand Vizir—and lastly, by the courage and talent of the commander himself. But the combat was more destructive than lasting, terminating in the total discomfiture of the Ottomans, and the capture of the Grand Vizir.

No victory during the war had been more decisive—none so complete. The road to Constantinople was now clear, and Ibrahim lost no time in advancing towards it.

While these events of his army were occurring in such quick succession, Mohammed did not allow his navy to remain inactive. His fleet, augmented by his activity to a very formidable force, but still much inferior to that of the Sultan, set sail from Egypt early in the spring, and though the naval campaign was productive of no general action, Mohammed attained his object of embarrassing his opponent, and preventing the supply of provisions and munitions of war to the Ottoman army in Syria. Six small vessels of the enemy fell into the hands of the Egyptians, and two of the Pasha's corvettes were captured by the Turks.

To return, however, to Ibrahim and his victories. The news of the battle of Koniah, and the advance of the victor upon the capital, spread consternation in the Porte; and its government, as if stupified by the blow, displayed no energy or spirit to meet the approaching consequences. The Czar, however, having proffered aid, the Russian general, Muravieff, as well as Halif, late Captain Pasha, were despatched to Alexandria to treat for an armistice: which the Viceroy at once acceded, and sent immediate instructions

to Ibrahim to stop his march until further orders. Prior, however, to the receipt of this intelligence, the Egyptian commander had pushed on his advanced-guard towards Broussa, and the fears of the Sultan had induced him, on the 2nd February, to apply to Russia for aid, both by sea and by land. With this, his ambitious ally readily complied, and a fleet from Sebastopo sailed for the Bosphorus, on the 20th February, to defend the passage from Asia into Europe; but before its arrival, the favourable news came from Alexandria, and the Russian squadron, in consequence, retired to Sizopoli, the nearest harbour to the channel of Constantinople, in readiness to act as circumstances might require. In this state of affairs, a treaty, framed under the advice of Admiral Roussin, the French ambassador, was forwarded to Mohammed Ali for his acceptance, offering the vassalage of the districts of Acre, Jerusalem, and Tripoli; but, on the 8th March the Viceroy returned a decided refusal of the proposals; and at the same time he despatched orders to advance to Ibrahim, who immediately concentrated his forces, and pushed on from Kintukia. Constantinople was, once more, in dismay. The Russians hastened to its protection and landed, to the number of 20,000 men, under Count Orloff, at Scutari, on the Asiatic side of the Strait, where they encamped between Ibrahim and the Bosphorus. To



avert the dangers which threatened him on both sides, the Sultan, fearful alike of the presence of the Russian as of the Egyptian, was induced to grant Mohammed a portion of his demands, and authorized M. Varennes to proceed to Ibrahim's head-quarters with an offer of the Pashalic of Aleppo, in addition to the Vassalage of Acre, Jerusalem, and Tripoli; but the Arabian General insisted immovably on receiving likewise the district of Adana, a demand with which Mahmoud found it at last necessary to comply. Military operations in Asia Minor between Russia and Egypt would only have thrown him more completely into the power of the former. On the 5th May, therefore, he gave up Adana, and solemnly confirmed it, together with the whole of Syria, to the Pasha, granting at the same an amnesty to all its inhabitants, for the conduct which they might have followed during the expedition of Ibrahim. The Viceroy was now master from the limits of Asia Minor to the mouth of the Nile, and had shown that at his pleasure he could make the Sultan tremble within the walls of the Seraglio. To Russia, these events were not unproductive of considerable advantage. A convention between the Czar and the Sultan resulted—the celebrated treaty of the 8th July, so well known as that of Unkiar Skelessi, a treaty of reciprocal defence; by which the former stipulated to aid the Porte in sup-

pressing all disturbances, and the Sultan consented to shut the Dardanelles, in particular circumstances, against all other nations. England and France complained that such a treaty should have been concluded without their concurrence; each of them had a fleet near the Sea of Marmora: but their remonstrances were unheeded, and their fleets returned.

These events occurred during the early part of the year 1833, and the pacification was celebrated at Alexandria with striking demonstrations of joy.

"After the conclusion of peace," says Mr. Addison in his highly interesting work, '*Damascus and Palmyra*,' "Ibrahim repassed Mount Taurus. He halted at Adana, and employed European engineers in fortifying the passes of the mountains, and strengthening his newly acquired frontier. The Syrian people were dazzled by his rapid and brilliant success. They formed great expectations from the language of the addresses which he had distributed among them, and from the general reports that were circulated of a better state of things arising under the government of Mohammed Ali than under the old system. The tyranny, the oppression, and the indolence of local governors, would now, it was said, be effectually annihilated; the sanguinary wars promoted by rival pashas, and the pillage and devastation of the country, would give way to tranquillity

and happiness under a strong government, which would extend equal protection to all. The too sanguine hopes of the Syrians were, however, soon most miserably disappointed. The principle that the chief aim of the government ought to be to promote the interest and happiness of those committed to its charge, is not received by Mohammed Ali any more than by other Eastern governors, and the lightening of the burdens of the people, and affording security to property, comported, not at all, with his ambitious views and designs.

“The Syrians still possessed property to be seized, and there was still some small rural population left which would serve the Pasha for soldiers, of which he stood in great need. The fair promises, therefore, which had been made were not intended to be realized; nor was the language of the addresses a true exposition of the principles upon which the Pasha intended to conduct the government of the country. The addresses were distributed when a powerful army was in front, and a doubtful population in the rear. They were issued to calm the minds of the excited, and to inspire confidence in the new government. Peace however being concluded, and the frontier fortified against an attack from the Turks, the real designs of Mohammed Ali were very shortly unfolded.

“The ambition and grasping propensities of this potentate had extended his dominion to the north, east, and south of Egypt. His troops were already in the occupation of Sennaar, and were pushed on to the confines of Abyssinia. In the Hedjaz he was engaged in a difficult and expensive war with the Wahabee Arabs; and on the Syrian frontier he was constructing stations and fortresses, and establishing garrisons, to protect his newly-acquired dominions from the attempts of the Ottoman Porte. To support all these operations men and money were required, and they were shortly exacted with a merciless rigour. The hopes of the Syrians were blasted, and the language of the Pasha's address so full of promise falsified. The grinding system of taxation, the heavy exactions that were made in the Syrian towns and villages, and the harshness employed to compel the people to enter the military service, threw the population at once into despair.”

These severities and exactions, so well described by the author from whom we have extracted the foregoing remarks, engendered the accustomed results of tyranny and oppression. In 1834 a spirit of insurrection spreading through the mountains of Nablous, on Djebel Khahil, and various districts of Palestine, the insurgents from Mount Lebanon rose in arms, and attacked and routed with considerable



slaughter the Egyptian regiments stationed in the neighbourhood of Nablous, and the Bedouin Arabs, crossing the Jordan from the eastward, drove back Ibrahim's troops, and even threatened Jerusalem. In this alarming aspect of affairs Mohammed Ali deemed it advisable to visit Syria in person, and accordingly sailed for Jaffa on the 24th of June, with eight thousand men. His presence and the arrival of so powerful a reinforcement produced a decided effect: the insurgent chiefs, struck with dismay, remained nearly inactive, and Ibrahim was soon enabled to carry at the point of the bayonet the villages in the mountains; but tranquillity was scarcely restored in this part of the country before revolts broke out in Aleppo, Beirout, and Antioch, and were only suppressed by severe and most sanguinary measures. To still further retain the Syrians in due subjection, Ibrahim determined to disarm the whole population, and prohibited any individual, on pain of the bastinado, to carry a weapon about his person. Large sums continued to be expended in fortifying the new frontier, and men and money to be unrelentingly exacted. "The villages and the towns," continues the same intelligent traveller,\* "were surrounded by troops, and the youngest, the healthiest, and the strongest of the population were marched off into

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\* Addison.

Egypt, to be trained as soldiers. Of all the arbitrary measures, none created such abhorrence as this : young men maimed themselves, and women maimed their children—some were blinded, and others had their fingers cut off, to avoid the conscription, until the Pasha enforced a stern decree to shoot all such offenders. Many of the most vigorous of the young men were drafted from Beirout ; their resistance was overcome with threats and blows, and they were marched off amid the bitter anguish and consternation of their relations, to die of sickness in the interior of Africa, or to leave their bones to whiten on the desert sands of the Hedjaz.\* While these transactions harassed the

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\* In the autumn of 1835, Ibrahim Pasha carried into effect a bold stroke of policy. Having quietly issued orders to various Egyptian regiments, he suddenly concentrated a force of 12,000 men in the heart of Mount Lebanon, and proceeded to disarm the subjects of the venerable Emir Beshir, the prince of the Druses. The old emir, taken by surprise, could make no resistance ; and the Druse and Christian population of the mountains, over whom he exercised a great influence, were deprived of all their weapons, even to their hunting-knives. The Emir Beshir is of the illustrious Arab family Shehab, which has for some time past reigned over the mountain population of Lebanon. The branch from which he is descended settled in Syria during the fervour of the Crusades, and soon acquired an extensive influence and dominion. The emir claims to be a *schereef*, or descendant of the Prophet, and is as much respected for his personal character and domestic virtues as for the nobility of his birth. He is said to be a Christian ; his confidential attendants are of that faith, as well as many members of his family. By Mohammed Ali he has been regarded with an eye of suspi-

Viceroy in his Syrian conquests, the war in Arabia progressed most unfavourably: the forces which had been despatched to the conquest of Yemen were utterly defeated, their magazines captured, and themselves compelled to fall back upon Mecca, and thence to retreat into Egypt. Mohammed's resources seem always, however, to have increased with his difficulties. A considerable army was again sent to Yemen, and eventually succeeded in greatly extending the Pasha's territories. In thus mentioning the result of the Arabian campaign, we have somewhat anticipated the chronological course of events. In 1835, Mohammed, whose ambitious mind was ever bent on the achievement of an hereditary empire, endeavoured to obtain the sanction of England, France, and Austria, to the declaration of his independence, and put forth, in an official note addressed

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cion, and is supposed always to have remained faithful in heart to the Sultan, but to have been compelled to bend to the force of circumstances. There seems to be every reason to think that he will gladly return to his allegiance to the Porte, as soon as he has an opportunity of doing so without compromising his personal security. The Emir Beshir is remarkably fond of the English; he was a great friend and admirer of Sir Sidney Smith, and in his interviews with English travellers never fails to inquire after our gallant countryman. A more patriarchal, venerable, and majestic figure than the Emir Beshir can scarcely be imagined. He is a fine old man, near ninety years of age, with long white whiskers, flowing down each side of his face, terminating in a snow-white beard of great length.



to the Cabinets of those countries, the difficulties he laboured under from the pretensions and enmity of the Porte, and the advantages that might accrue to the states of Europe by the disposal of his large military resources against Russia; but Lord Ponsonby at once rejected the proffered arrangement, counselling the Viceroy, at the same time, to evacuate the pashalic of Orpha, of which he kept unjustifiable possession, and to pay the tribute which he withheld from the Porte. With affairs in this posture, the year 1835 closed: the revolts in several of the Turkish provinces in the ensuing season disabled the Sultan from undertaking the re-conquest of Syria. Meanwhile the course of Mohammed Ali continued one of unmitigated oppression in that distracted province, and towards the end of 1837 the Druses raised the standard of revolt throughout Hoauran and Mount Ledodiah. Achmet Pasha was sent with a force of 20,000 men to reduce them, but the insurgents, who were advantageously posted in their mountain fastnesses, fought with great gallantry, and after a severe conflict, 11th February, 1836, drove Achmet to Damascus. The advent, however, of Ibrahim, at the scene of action, attended by Solyman Pasha (Colonel Seve), gave speedily a very different turn to the war, and soon effectually terminated the rebellion.

Shortly after its suppression, Mohammed, who

had made another unsuccessful effort to obtain the sanction of the European powers to a declaration of independence, shook off diplomacy for a time, and took the singular resolution of exploring the countries of Sennaar, and the gold mines of Tachiangora. Leaving Egypt exposed to the course of events, the aged Pasha, borne down with the weight of seventy years, ventured on a journey scarcely bearable by the iron frame of the enthusiastic Bruce, and, through an inhospitable and warlike country, proceeded to ascend the Nile, to search for gold in the south-eastern provinces of Abyssinia. He returned from his fruitless expedition in February 1839, and immediately commenced active preparations for the coming war, which he knew to be inevitable.

Induced probably by the discovery of Mohammed Ali's intrigues at Bagdad and other parts of the empire, the Sultan, despite of the truce which had been effected after the battle of Koniah, determined on a bold offensive measure for the recovery of his conquered provinces. With this view, and prior to any declaration of war, the Seraskier Hafiz Pasha, at the head of a considerable army, invaded the territory in the possession of Mohammed Ali, and attempted to excite disaffection in some of the Syrian villages ; a manifesto, dated 8th May, 1839, being issued by the Porte, depriving the Viceroy and

his son of their functions and dignities, and appointing the generalissimo of the Ottoman army successor of Mohammed in the government of Egypt. On the 27th of May following, Hafiz attacked the advanced guard of Ibrahim's army, which, much inferior in numbers, fell back on the approach of the Turks. Ibrahim, however, soon concentrated his forces, and becoming in his turn the aggressor, totally defeated the Turkish army.

The details of this most decisive engagement—the Battle of Nezib—which again opened to Ibrahim the road to Constantinople, are vividly described in the following letter from Alexandria, which was published at the time.

“ALEXANDRIA, *July 6th.*

“The Turkish army of Syria is defunct. The following are the facts :—On the 20th of June his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, commanding the Egyptian army, moved from his encampment, and crossed the Ladjour, and then marched to the village of Mezga, where the Sultan's cavalry, commanded by four pashas, was encamped. His Highness Ibrahim Pasha ordered all his artillery to take up a position within half a mile of the Turkish army, and to cannonade it. At five P. M. they opened their fire; in half an hour the Turkish cavalry fled pell-mell, in the direction of Nezib (where the Sultan's main army was encamped, under Hafiz Pasha), leaving behind all their provisions

and military chests. His Highness Ibrahim Pasha then halted the Egyptian force, for repose, till midnight.

"June 21st.—At midnight he marched towards Negib; fell in, after daylight, with the cavalry he had cannonaded before, and all the remaining cavalry of the Turkish force, which had been advanced in two divisions, viz. one half at Mezga, and the other in advance of Nezib. Ibrahim Pasha ordered the artillery to commence their fire, and his cavalry to charge. In four hours the whole of the Sultan's cavalry gave way and fled, leaving fourteen pieces of small cannon (all they had) behind.

"June 22nd.—The Egyptian army reposed this day.

"June 23rd.—His Highness, with two regiments of cavalry, accompanied by his body-guard and his light artillery, left the camp, and trotted up to the walls of Nezib, leaving orders with Suluman Pasha, his lieutenant-general, to move on after him, as slowly as possible, in order that the troops might not be fatigued.

"On the 26th, at midnight, the whole of the Egyptian force was in presence of the Turks, and shortly afterwards commenced a general action, of which I give you an account in the following extract of a letter from the Austrian Consul at Aleppo, dated June 26th, in the evening.

"*The army of Hafiz Pasha ceased to exist yester-*



day, after a cannonade of three hours. The Turks threw down their arms, and abandoned the artillery and ammunition, flying in every direction. Not one of them could have reached the Euphrates had Ibrahim Pasha wished seriously to prevent it. The city of Aleppo has petitioned Ibrahim Pasha to make arrangements for obliging the disarmed soldiery of Hafiz Pasha to recross the Euphrates, in order not to disturb the security we enjoy here.

“On the field of battle were taken several English amateurs, who were brought hither by curiosity, and who have expressed their great astonishment at the luckless result of the campaign. Their friends need be under no apprehension, as Ibrahim Pasha will give them instant liberty.

“This day (July 6th) the Pasha's steamers, the *Generous* and the *Egyptian*, arrived ; but we regret to say that they do not bring Ibrahim Pasha's despatches. We suppose he thinks his laconic telegraph despatch to his father, via Damietta, to be sufficient. It runs thus : ‘The Turks are dispersed ; they have left behind them everything, besides 6000 prisoners.’ By these vessels we learn that 4000 of the said prisoners have applied to enter the Pasha's service. They have been accepted, and transports have been ordered to Scandaroon to bring them here. They will probably be sent to the Hedjas and Yemen,

to assist in bringing the whole of Arabia under the Egyptian government."

Almost at the very period of these disasters, (30th June, 1839,) the Sultan (Mahmoud II.), one of the best and most enlightened of Ottoman monarchs, died, leaving a full half of his fairest provinces usurped by a triumphant vassal, his capital protected by his very enemies, and his throne inherited by a child; and scarcely had the last rites been paid to his remains, when, as if to give the final blow to the Ottoman power, the treason of the Capitan Pasha delivered (on the 14th July) the whole Turkish fleet to the Egyptian viceroy, by whom it is still retained.

These momentous events were not disregarded in Europe. England and France at once determined to unite to hold Russia in check, and proposed to force the Dardanelles, in case that power attempted to aid the Sultan by marching to Constantinople; a determination which, in conjunction with the union of their fleets, induced the Czar to despatch proposals to the court of London, abandoning all pretence to an *exclusive* protection of the Sultan, but merely stipulating for the integrity of the Ottoman empire. With this view, the English ministry, aware of the despotic rule of Mohammed, coincided, as did France at the commencement; but a difference of opinion

soon manifested itself. France contended that the integrity of the Ottoman empire meant its preservation from the Russians alone, and did not imply the repossession by the Porte of the conquests of the Pasha; while the other powers held, that to sustain the integrity of the Ottoman empire, implied its protection, not only against Russia, but against any other invader whatsoever. Hence arose, to the exclusion of France, the treaty of alliance between England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and hence directly followed the expedition, which has proved so successful, to the coast of Syria.

Having thus brought to a close our sketch of "the progress and position of Mohammed Ali," we will take a rapid survey of the effects which his restless activity and spirit of innovation have produced in the country over which he rules. His government, too extravagantly praised by some, is certainly much more rational, orderly, and humane, than that of the Mamelukes, or of the old pashas, in the other dominions of the Porte. He administers impartial justice to all his subjects, without regard to race or religion; has established regular judicial courts, and a good police; has done away with tortures and other barbarous punishments; has encouraged instruction, to a certain extent; has removed most of the ignorant prejudices which existed among his subjects against



the arts and learning of Europe ; and has introduced European manufactures and machinery. He keeps a printing-office and a journal ; has formed schools and colleges for the arts and sciences, and for military and naval tactics. All this is much more than it may seem, at first sight, to a person unacquainted with the state of Egypt and other Turkish provinces forty years ago. But the Pasha's ambition, and the difficulties of his situation, have obliged him to resort to two violent expedients,—an enormous taxation and an oppressive conscription. The pretended legislative assembly sitting at Cairo is a mere fiction of enthusiastic panegyrists. The government of Egypt is still absolute in the strictest sense of the word, though the present Pasha has chosen to govern according to forms and regulations which he has himself established. He has formed a council consisting of his chief officers, and of the provincial and local governors and sheikhs, whom he occasionally consults. Many of the subordinate agents of the government in the provinces still exercise occasional acts of capricious tyranny, which seldom reach their master's ears ; but whenever they do, he is not slow in punishing the offenders and redressing the grievances of the oppressed.

Of the views and feelings of Mohammed Ali, his actions are perhaps the best exposition, and might be adduced as evidence of an elevated and aspiring mind,

still clouded indeed with some of the darkest shades of his original barbarism, and occasionally impelled by the force of uncontrolled passion. In person he is short and rather corpulent, with a high forehead and aquiline nose, and possessing an intellectual expression of countenance. His dress is studiously plain; the only expense which he allows himself in matters connected with his person being lavished on his arms, some of which are studded with diamonds. Like that of Napoleon, his outward appearance seems to have changed considerably with the progress of years; for although, when between thirty and forty, he was described by a British traveller as "of a slender make, sallow complexion, and under the middle size," he is reported by the latest visitors to have become "thick-set," and somewhat full in the figure. "On our arrival," says Richardson, "we were immediately ushered into the Pasha's presence, and found him sitting on the corner of the divan, surrounded by his officers and men, who were standing at a respectful distance. He received us sitting, but in the most gracious manner, and placed the Earl of Belmore and Mr. Salt upon his left hand, and his lordship's two sons and myself at the top of the room on his right. The interpreter stood, as well as the officers and soldiers, who remained in the room during the whole time of my visit. He began the conversation by wel-

coming us to Cairo, and prayed that God might preserve us and grant us prosperity. He then inquired of the noble traveller how long he had been from England, and what was the object of his journey to Egypt; to all which he received satisfactory answers. His Highness next adverted to the prospect before him,—the Nile, the grain-covered fields, the pyramids of Djizeh, the bright sun, and the cloudless sky; and remarked, with a certain triumphant humour on his lip, that ‘England offered no such prospect to the eye of the spectator.’ He was told that the scenery of England was very fine. ‘How can that be,’ he shortly rejoined, ‘seeing you are steeped in rain and fog three-quarters of the year?’ He next turned the conversation to Mr. Leslie’s elegant experiment of freezing water in the vacuum of an air-pump; which he had never seen, but admired prodigiously in description, and seemed to anticipate with great satisfaction a glass of lemonade and iced water for himself and friends as the happiest result of the discovery. Talking of his Lordship’s intended voyage up the Nile, he politely offered to render every possible facility; cautioning him at the same time to keep a sharp lookout among the Arabs, who, he believed would not take anything from him or his party by violence, but would certainly steal if they found an opportunity of doing it without the risk of detection,

He then related a number of anecdotes touching the petty larcenies of that most thievish race ; some of which were by no means without contrivance or dexterity. But the one which seemed to amuse both himself and his friends the most, was that of a traveller who, when eating his dinner, laid down his spoon to reach for a slice of bread, and by the time he brought back his hand, his spoon was away ; the knife and fork soon shared the same fate ; and the unfortunate stranger was at length reduced to the sad necessity of tearing his meat, and lifting it with his fingers and thumb like the Arabs themselves. Many persons were near, but no one saw the theft committed ; and all search for the recovery of the property was vain. We now took leave of the Viceroy, leaving him in the greatest good humour. He said we might go everywhere, and see everything we wished ; and that he hoped to have the pleasure of seeing us again."



## QUADRUPLE TREATY.

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1. Copy of the Convention concluded between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and the Sublime Porte,
  2. *Acte séparé* annexed to the said Treaty.
  3. Protocol signed the same day, reserving the rights of the Porte to the Dardanelles and Bosphorus.
  4. Secret Protocol (*Protocole réservé*), signed the same day.
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### CONVENTION

*Concluded between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, of the one part, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte of the other, for the Pacification of the Levant ; signed at London, the 15th July, 1840.*

IN the name of the most merciful God,

His Highness the Sultan having had recourse to their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, to reclaim their aid and their assistance in the midst of the difficulties in which he finds himself placed in consequence of the hostile conduct of Mehemet Ali, Pacha of Egypt—difficulties which threaten to injure the integrity of the Ottoman empire and the independence of the throne

of the Sultan ; their said Majesties, united by the sentiment of sincere friendship which subsists between them, animated by the desire to watch over the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire, in the interest of consolidating the peace of Europe, faithful to the engagements which were contracted by the note transmitted to the Porte, by their representative at Constantinople, the 27th July, 1839 ; and desiring, moreover, to prevent the effusion of blood which the continuation of the hostilities lately broken out in Syria between the authorities of the Pasha and the subjects of his Highness occasion ;

Their said Majesties and his Highness the Sultan have resolved, with the above end, to conclude between them a convention, and have named for that purpose for their plenipotentiaries—namely,

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Most Honourable Henry John, Viscount Palmerston, Baron Temple, Peer of Ireland, Member of her Britannic Majesty's Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the most Honourable Order of the Bath, Member of Parliament, and her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, Philip, Baron de Nieuman,



Commander of the Order of Leopold of Austria, Knight of the Cross of Civil Merit, Commander of the Order of the Tower and Sword of Portugal, Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stanislaus of the second class of Russia, Aulic Counsellor, and Plenipotentiary near her Britannic Majesty.

His Majesty the King of Prussia, Henry William, Baron de Bulow, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle of the first class of Prussia, Grand Cross of the Order of Leopold of Austria, and of the Guelphs of Hanover, Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stanislaus of the second class, and of St. Waldemir of the fourth class of Russia, Commander of the Order of the Falcon of Saxe Weimar, his Chamberlain, Privy Counsellor, Actual Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary near her Britannic Majesty.

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, Philip, Baron de Brunow, Knight of the Order of St. Anne of the first class, of St. Stanislaus of the first class, of St. Waldemir of the third class, Commander of the Order of St. Etienne of Hungary, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle, and of St. John of Jerusalem, his Privy Counsellor, and Envoy Extraordinary near her Britannic Majesty.

And his Most Majestic and Most High Majesty Sultan Abdul Medjid, Emperor of the Ottomans, Chekib Effendi, of the Order of Nichan Iftchar of the

first class, Beylikdgi of the Imperial Divan, Honorary Counsellor of Foreign Affairs, his Ambassador Extraordinary near her Britannic Majesty.

Who, having reciprocally interchanged their full powers in good and due form, have agreed on and signed the following articles:—

ART. I.—His Highness the Sultan, being agreed with their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, on the conditions of the arrangement which it is the intention of his Highness to allow to Mehemet Ali—conditions which will be found specified in the separate act hereto annexed—their Majesties engage themselves to act with perfect accord, and to unite their efforts to determine Mehemet Ali to conform to this arrangement, each of the high contracting parties reserving to itself to co-operate to this end with the means of action which each of them can dispose of.

ART. II.—If the Pacha of Egypt should refuse to adhere to the said arrangement, which shall be communicated to him by the Sultan, with the concurrence of their said Majesties, the latter engage to take, at the requisition of the Sultan, the measures concerted and agreed on between them, for the end of putting this arrangement into execution; in the meantime the

Sultan having invited his allies to join him to assist in interrupting the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria, and to prevent the expedition of troops, horses, arms, ammunition, and munitions of war of all kinds from one part of these provinces to the other, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, engage to give immediately to this effect the necessary orders to the commanders of the naval forces in the Mediterranean ; their said Majesties promising, moreover, that the commanders of their squadrons, according to the means of which they can dispose, shall give in the name of the alliance all and every assistance in their power to those subjects of the Sultan, who may manifest their fidelity and obedience to their Sovereign.

ART. III.—If Mehemet Ali, after having refused to submit to the conditions of the arrangement above-mentioned, should direct his forces by land or sea towards Constantinople, the high contracting parties, on the requisition made by the Sultan to their representatives at Constantinople, are all agreed in such case to answer the invitation of that sovereign, and to provide for the defence of his throne, by means of a co-operation concerted in common for the purpose of putting the two straits of the Bosphorus and Dar-

danelles, as well as the capital of the Ottoman empire, secure against all aggression. It is likewise agreed that the forces which, in consequence of such attempt, receive the destination above indicated, shall remain employed as long as their presence be required by the Sultan; and when his highness shall judge that their presence has ceased to be necessary, the said forces shall retire simultaneously, and enter respectively into the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

ART. IV.—It is always distinctly understood that the co-operation mentioned in the preceding article, and destined to place temporarily the straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, and the Ottoman capital, under the safeguard of the high contracting parties, against all aggression of Mehemet Ali, shall not be considered but as a measure exceptional, adopted at the express desire of the Sultan, and solely for his defence. But it is agreed that this measure will derogate in nothing to the ancient law of the Ottoman empire, in virtue of which it has been in all times prohibited to vessels of war of foreign powers to enter into the straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus; and the Sultan, on his part, declares by the present act, that, with the exception of the eventuality above-mentioned, he has the firm resolve to maintain for the future the principle invariably esta-

blished as the ancient regulation of his empire, and as long as the Porte is at peace not to admit any foreign vessel of war into the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. On the other part, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, engage to respect that determination of the Sultan, and to conform to the principle above declared.

ART. V.—The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratification exchanged at London, within the space of two months, or sooner, if possible.

In faith of which the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 15th of July, in the year of Grace 1840.

(Signed)

PALMERSTON.

[CHERIE.

NIEUMAN.

BULOW.

BRUNOW.



ADDITIONAL ACT.

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*Additional Act (acte séparé) annexed to the Convention concluded at London, the 15th July 1840, between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, of the one part, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte of the other.*

HIS Highness the Sultan has the intention to record and to make known to Mehemet Ali the conditions of the arrangement subjoined.

I.—His Highness promises to accord to Mehemet Ali, for him and for his descendants in line direct, the administration of the Pachalic of Egypt; and his Highness promises, moreover, to accord to Mehemet Ali, during his life, with the title of Pacha of Acre, and the command of the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre, the administration of the southern part of Syria, of which the limits are designed by the following line of demarcation :—

This line drawn from the Cape Ras-el-Nakhora, on the shores of the Mediterranean, extending from thence directly to the mouth of the river Seisaban, northern extremity of the Tiberias, along the western coast of the said lake, following the right bank of the river Jordan and the western coast of the Dead Sea,

extending from thence in a right line as far as the Red Sea, and resting on the northern point of the Gulf d'Akaber, and following the western coast of the Gulf d'Akaber and the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez, as far as Suez.

Nevertheless, the Sultan in making these offers, attaches to them the condition that Mehemet Ali accepts them within the space of ten days after the communication has been made to him at Alexandria, by an agent of his Highness; and that at the same time, Mehemet Ali deposits in the hands of that agent the necessary orders to the commanders of his forces by sea and land, to retire immediately from Arabia, and all the holy cities therein situated; from the island of Candia, the district of Adana, and all the other parts of the Ottoman empire which are not comprised in the limits of Egypt, and in that of the Pachalic of Acre, such as they are above designed.

II.—If within the space of ten days above fixed, Mehemet Ali does not accept the said arrangement, the Sultan will then withdraw the offer of the life administration of the Pachalic of Acre; but his Highness will still consent to accord to Mehemet Ali, for him and his descendants in line direct, the administration of the Pachalic of Egypt, provided that this offer be accepted in the space of ten days following, that is to say, in the space of twenty days, counting from the

date of the communication made to him ; and provided that he likewise deposits in the hands of the agent of the Sultan, the necessary instructions to his commanders by land and by sea, to retire immediately within the limits and within the ports of the Pachalic of Egypt.

III.—The annual tribute to be paid the Sultan by Mehemet Ali, shall be proportioned more or less to the territory of which the latter will obtain the administration, according as he accepts the first or the second ultimatum.

IV.—It is moreover expressly understood, that in the first, as well as in the second ultimatum, Mehemet Ali (before the expiration of the term fixed of ten or twenty days) shall be bound to send back the Turkish fleet, with the crews and *armamens*, to the care of the Turkish authority, who shall be charged to receive them—the commanders of the allied squadrons assisting at this restoration (*remise*).

It is understood that in any case Mehemet Ali cannot charge in account, nor deduct from the tribute payable to the Sultan, the expenses of keeping up the Ottoman fleet during the time that it has remained in an Egyptian port.

V.—All the treaties and all the laws of the Ottoman empire shall be applicable to Egypt and the Pachalic of Acre, such as it be above designed, as well

as to every other part of the Ottoman empire; but the Sultan consents, that on condition of the regular payment of tribute above mentioned, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall levy imposts in the name of the Sultan, and as the delegate of his Highness in the provinces of which the administration is to be to him confided. It is further understood that on the condition of receiving the above taxes and imposts, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall provide for all expenses of the civil and military administration of said provinces.

VI.—The land and sea forces which the Pacha of Egypt and of Acre may maintain, shall form part of the forces of the Ottoman empire, and shall always be considered as kept up for the service of the state.

VII.—The present separate act shall bear the same force and value as if it were inserted word for word in the convention of this day. It shall be ratified, and the ratification exchanged at London, the same time with those of the said convention.

In faith of which the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 15th of July, in the year of Grace, 1840.

(Signed)

PALMERSTON.

[CHEKIB.

NIEUMAN.

BULOW.

BRUNOW.



PROTOCOL RESERVING THE RIGHTS OF  
THE PORTE.

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*Protocol signed at London by the Plenipotentiaries of their  
Majesties, &c., the 15th July, 1840.*

IN affixing his signature to the convention of this day, the plenipotentiary of the Sublime Ottoman Porte has declared—

That in stating, in the Fourth Article of the said convention, the ancient law of the Ottoman empire, in virtue of which it is prohibited at all times to foreign vessels of war to enter in the straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, the Sublime Porte reserves to herself, as heretofore, to deliver firmans to light vessels under the flag of war, which are employed, according to custom, in the service of the correspondence of the legations of friendly powers.

The plenipotentiaries have taken note of this present declaration, to bring it to the knowledge of their courts.

(Signed)

PALMERSTON.

NIEUMAN.

BULOW.

BRUNOW.



SECRET PROTOCOL.

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*Secret Protocol, signed at London the 15th July, 1840, by the Plenipotentiaries of their Majesties, &c.*

THE plenipotentiaries of their Majesties, &c., having, in virtue of their full powers, concluded and signed, this day, a convention between their respective Sovereigns for the pacification of the Levant ;

Considering, that from the distance which separates the capitals of their respective courts, a certain space of time must necessarily elapse before the exchange of the ratification of the said convention could be effected, and that orders founded on that act could be put into execution ;

And the said plenipotentiaries being profoundly penetrated with the conviction, that looking at the actual state of things in Syria, the interests of humanity, and the grave considerations of European policy, which constitute the object of the common solicitude of the powers signing the said convention of this day, imperiously require the prevention as much as possible of any delay in the accomplishment of the pacification which the said transaction is destined to attain.

The said plenipotentiaries, in virtue of their full powers, agree between themselves that the preliminary

measures mentioned in Article II. of the said convention shall be put into execution at once, and without waiting for the exchange of the ratifications, consent formally by the present act, with the assent of their courts, to the immediate execution of their measures.

It is agreed on besides by the said plenipotentiaries that his Highness the Sultan shall proceed to address to Mehemet Ali the communication and the offers specified in the separate act annexed to the convention of this date.

It is agreed, moreover, that the consular agents of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, will put themselves in communication with the agent of the Sultan to address to Mehemet Ali the communication and offers above mentioned; that the said consuls will give to this agent all the assistance, and all the aid in their power; and they will employ all their means of influence on Mehemet Ali to the purpose of determining him to accept the arrangement offered to him by order of his Sublime Highness the Sultan.

The admirals of the respective squadrons, in the Mediterranean, will receive the necessary instructions to placethemselves in communication with the said consuls.

(Signed)

PALMERSTON.

NIEUMAN.

BULOW.

BRUNOW.

## THE TREATY OF THE FOUR POWERS.

*Note on the affairs of the East, addressed, on 31st August, by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Mr. HENRY LYTTON BULWER, her Britannic Majesty's minister plenipotentiary at Paris, in the absence of his Excellency Earl Granville. This document was officially communicated to the French Government, and subsequently printed and transmitted to the Allied Courts.*

“FOREIGN OFFICE, Aug. 31, 1840.

“SIR,—Various circumstances have prevented me from sooner transmitting to you, and through you to the French Government, some observations which her Majesty's Government is desirous of making upon the memorandum delivered to me, on the 24th of July, by the French ambassador at this court, in reply to the memorandum which I had delivered to his Excellency on the 17th of that month : but I now proceed to do so.

“Her Majesty's Government observed with great satisfaction the friendly tone of the French memorandum, and the assurances which it contains of the earnest desire of France to maintain peace, and to uphold the balance of power in Europe. The memorandum of the 17th of July was conceived in a spirit of equal friendliness towards France ; and her Majesty's Government is as anxious as that of France can be to preserve the peace of Europe, and to prevent any derangement of the existing balance of power.

“Her Majesty's Government also saw with much pleasure the declarations which the French memorandum contains, that France wishes to act in concert with the other four powers in regard to the affairs of the Levant ; that

she has never been actuated in these matters by any other motive than a desire to preserve peace; and that in the judgment she had formed upon the propositions which have been made to her, she has never been influenced by any selfish interests of her own, being, in fact, as disinterested as any other power can be in the affairs of the Levant.

"The sentiments of her Majesty's Government upon these points are in all respects similar to, and corresponding with, those of the Government of France; for, in the first place, in the whole course of the negotiations which have been going on upon these matters during the last twelve months, it has invariably been the anxious desire of the British Government that a concert should be established between the five powers, and that all the five should agree in a common course of conduct; and her Majesty's Government feels that it can refer for proofs of this desire to the various propositions which from time to time have been made to the Government of France, and which are alluded to in the French memorandum; and, in the next place, her Majesty's Government can safely affirm that no power in Europe can be less influenced than Great Britain is by any selfish views, or by any desire or expectation of exclusive advantage to arise to herself out of the settlement of the affairs of the Levant; for, on the contrary, the interests of Great Britain in those affairs is identified with that of Europe at large, and lies in the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire, as a security for the preservation of peace, and as an essential element in the general balance of power.

"In these principles the French Government has declared its full concurrence; and it has stated that concurrence upon many occasions, but especially in Marshal Soult's despatch of the 17th of July, 1839, which was communicated officially to the four Powers, in the collective note of the 27th of July 1839, and in the speech of the King of the French to his Chambers, in December, 1839.

"In these documents the French Government declared its determination to maintain the integrity and indepen-



dence of the Ottoman empire under its present dynasty, as an essential element of the balance of power, and as a security for the preservation of peace ; and it also asserted in Marshal Soult's despatch its resolution to oppose, by all its means of action and influence, every combination which might be hostile to the maintenance of that integrity and independence.

"The Governments of Great Britain and of France are, therefore, perfectly agreed as to the objects at which their policy in regard to the affairs of the Levant ought to aim, and as to the fundamental principles by which that policy ought to be guided ; and the only difference which exists between the two governments is a difference of opinion as to what means are best calculated to attain the common end—a point upon which, as the French memorandum observes, various opinions may naturally be expected to exist.

"Upon this point there has indeed arisen a considerable difference of opinion between the two governments—a difference which seems to have become wider and more confirmed in proportion as the two governments have more fully explained their respective views ; and which, for the present, has prevented the two governments from co-operating together for the attainment of their common object.

"On the one hand, her Majesty's Government has all along declared the opinion that it would be impossible to maintain the integrity of the Turkish empire, and to uphold the independence of the Sultan's throne, if Mehemet Ali were to be left in the occupation of Syria. Her Majesty's Government has stated that it considers Syria to be the military key of Asiatic Turkey ; and that if Mehemet Ali were to continue to occupy that province, in addition to Egypt, he would be able at all times to menace Bagdad to the south, Diarbekir and Erzeroum to the east, and Koniah, and Brussia, and Constantinople, to the north ; that the same spirit of ambition which has led Mehemet Ali on former occasions to revolt against his sovereign, would soon prompt him again to take up arms for further encroachment ; and that for this purpose he would always



keep a large army on foot ; that the Sultan, on the other hand, must see the danger by which he would constantly be threatened, and must be obliged also to remain armed ; and thus the Sultan and Mehemet Ali would continue to maintain large armies to watch each other ; that collision must inevitably arise out of mutual suspicion and alarm, even if it were no intentional aggression on either side ; that any such collision would necessarily lead to foreign interference in the interior of the Turkish empire, and that such interference so occasioned would produce the most serious differences between the Powers of Europe.

“ But her Majesty’s Government has pointed out a danger still greater than this, as a probable, if not certain consequence of the continued occupation of Syria by Mehemet Ali ; and that is, that the Pacha, confiding in his military strength, and tired of his political condition of subject, should execute the intention which he frankly informed the Powers of Europe two years ago he would never abandon, and should declare himself independent. Such a declaration on his part would be an undeniable dismemberment of the Ottoman empire ; and yet that dismemberment might happen under circumstances which would render it more difficult for the Powers of Europe to co-operate together, in order to compel the Pacha to retract such a declaration, than it is for them now to combine, in order to force him to evacuate Syria.

“ Her Majesty’s Government, therefore, has invariably contended that all those powers who wish to preserve the integrity of the Turkish empire, and to uphold the independence of the Sultan’s throne, ought to unite to assist the Sultan in re-establishing his direct authority in Syria.

“ The French Government, on the other hand, has argued that Mehemet Ali, if once secured in the permanent occupation of Egypt and Syria, would remain the faithful subject, and would become the firmest support of the Sultan ; that the Sultan could not govern Syria if he got it back again ; and that the military and financial resources of that province would be more available for the Sultan’s defence when in the hands of Mehemet Ali than if they were restored to the hands of the Sultan himself ; that implicit reliance might

be placed upon Mehemet Ali's abjurations of any further ambitious views, and in his protestations of devoted fidelity to his sovereign; that the Pacha is an old man, and that at his death, in spite of any hereditary grant made to his family, the whole of his acquired power would revert to the Sultan, because all possessions in Mahometan countries, be their nominal tenure what it may, are practically nothing more than life-holds.

"The French Government moreover contended, that Mehemet Ali would never of his own accord consent to evacuate Syria; and that the only means which the powers of Europe could employ to compel him, would be either naval operations, which would be insufficient, or land operations, which would be dangerous; that naval operations would not expel the Egyptians from Syria, and would only provoke Mehemet Ali to make an attack upon Constantinople; and that the measures which must be resorted to in such a case to defend the capital, but still more any land operations by troops of the allied powers to expel Mehemet's army from Syria, would be more fatal to the independence of the Turkish empire than could be the state of things which such proceedings might be intended to remedy.

"To this her Majesty's Government replied, that no reliance could be placed on Mehemet Ali's present protestations; that his ambition is insatiable, and only increases by success; and to give Mehemet Ali the power to encroach, and still to leave within his reach objects to covet, would be to sow the certain seeds of future collisions; that Syria is not further from Constantinople than many well-administered provinces of other empires are from the capital, and might be governed from Constantinople, as easily as from Alexandria; and that it is impossible that the resources of that province could be as useful to the Sultan when in the hands of a chief who might at any time turn those resources against the Sultan, as they would be if in the hands and at the disposal and command of the Sultan himself; that Ibrahim, having an army under his orders, has means to secure his own succession, at Mehemet Ali's death, to any authority which Mehemet

might die possessed of; and that it would not be fitting for the great powers to advise the Sultan to make an ostensible arrangement with Mehemet Ali, with a secret and reserved intention of breaking that arrangement on the very first occasion on which it might become applicable to events.

"The French Government, however, still retained its opinion, and declined to be a party to any arrangement which included the employment of coercive measures against Mehemet Ali.

"But the French memorandum states, that 'in the last circumstances no positive proposition has been made to France, upon which she was called upon to explain herself; and that, consequently, the determination which England communicated to her in the memorandum of the 17th July, no doubt in the name of the four powers, must not be imputed to refusals which France has not made.' This passage renders it necessary for me shortly to recapitulate to you the general course of the negotiation.

"The original opinion entertained by her Majesty's Government, and which was made known in June, 1839, to the other four powers, France included, was, that the only arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which could insure permanent peace in the Levant, would be that which should confine Mehemet Ali's delegated authority to Egypt alone, and should re-establish the direct authority of the Sultan in the whole of Syria, as well as in Candia and the holy cities; thus interposing the Desert between the Sultan's direct authority, and the province to be administered by the Pacha; and her Majesty's Government proposed that, as a compensation for the evacuation of Syria, Mehemet Ali should receive the assurance that his male descendants should succeed him as Governors of Egypt under the Sultan.

"To this proposal the French Government objected, saying, that such an arrangement would undoubtedly be the best, if there were the means to carry it into effect; but that Mehemet Ali would resist it; and that any measures of force which the allies might employ to compel him to yield would produce consequences which would be



more dangerous to the peace of Europe, and to the independence of the Porte, than the present state of things between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali could be. But though the French Government thus declined to agree to the British plan, yet for a considerable time afterwards it had no plan of its own to propose.

"However, in September, 1839, Count Sebastiani, the French ambassador at the court of London, proposed that a line should be drawn east and west, from the sea somewhere near Beyrout, to the desert near Damascus, and that all to the south of that line should be administered by Mehemet Ali, and all to the north of that line, by the direct authority of the Sultan; and the French ambassador gave her Majesty's Government to understand that if such an arrangement were agreed to by all the five powers, France would, in case of need, unite with the other four in the employment of coercive measures to compel Mehemet Ali to submit to it.

"This suggestion not having been adopted by her Majesty's Government, the French Government, on the 27th of September, 1839, communicated officially its own plan, which was, that Mehemet Ali should be made hereditary Governor of Egypt, and of the whole of Syria, and Governor for life of Candia, giving up nothing but Arabia, and the district of Adana. The French Government, however, did not say that it knew that Mehemet Ali would consent even to this arrangement; nor did it declare that, if he should refuse to accept it, France would join in coercive measures to compel him to do so.

"To this plan, of course, her Majesty's Government could not consent, because it would be even more objectionable than the present state of things; inasmuch as by giving Mehemet Ali a legal and hereditary title to a third of the Ottoman empire, which he now only occupies by force, it would at once be a virtual, and would at no distant time lead to a real, dismemberment of that empire. But her Majesty's Government, in order to prove its anxious desire to come to an understanding with France on these matters, stated, that it would waive its well-founded objection to any extension of Mehemet Ali's

authority beyond Egypt, and would join with the French Government in recommending to the Sultan to give to Mehemet Ali, in addition to the Pachalic of Egypt, the administration of the lower part of Syria, bounded to the north by a line drawn from Cape Carmel to the southern end of Lake Tiberias, and to the eastward by the Jordan, the western shore of the Dead Sea, and by a line from thence down to the Gulf of Akaba; provided that France would engage to co-operate with the four powers in coercive measures, if Mehemet Ali should refuse this offer.

"This proposal, however, was declined by the French Government, and that government now declared that it could not possibly co-operate in any coercive measure against Mehemet Ali, and could not, therefore, be a party to any arrangement to which Mehemet Ali should not spontaneously consent.

"But I pointed out to Count Sebastiani, that such an arrangement would be liable, though in a somewhat less degree, to all the objections which apply to the present relative position of the two parties, and therefore could not be agreed to by her Majesty's Government; and I observed that it appeared to be inconsistent, that France should be willing to employ coercive measures against Mehemet Ali to compel him to subscribe to this arrangement, which would evidently be incomplete, and insufficient for its professed purpose, and yet that France should refuse to employ coercive measures to compel Mehemet Ali to consent to the arrangement proposed by her Majesty's Government, which even France herself admitted would, if carried into execution, be complete and effectual for its purpose.

"To this Count Sebastiani replied, that the objections felt by the French Government to employ coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, were founded upon domestic considerations; and that those objections would be removed if the French Government were able to show to the public and to the Chambers, that it had procured for Mehemet Ali the best terms which could be obtained for him, and that he had refused to accept those terms.

"During the time that this discussion had been going on with France, a separate negotiation had been carried on



between Great Britain and Russia, with every detail and step of which, however, the French Government was regularly made acquainted. The negotiation with France was suspended for a time in the early part of this year, first by an expected, and afterwards by an actual, change of Ministry in France. But in the beginning of May, the Baron de Nieumann and myself determined, on the parts of our respective governments, to make one more attempt to bring France to an agreement with the four powers; and we resolved to submit to the French Government, through M. Guizot, another proposition for an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali.

"One objection, which had been urged by the French Government to the last British proposal was, that, although it would give Mehemet Ali the strong defensive position extending from Mount Carmel to Mount Tabor, it would deprive him of the fortress of Acre. In order, therefore, to meet this objection, Baron de Nieumann and myself proposed to M. Guizot, that the northern boundary of that part of Syria which should be administered by the Pacha, should be drawn from Cape Nakhora, to the northern end of Lake Tiberias, so as to include within its limits the fortress of Acre; and that the eastern boundary should run down along the western bank of Lake Tiberias; and thence, as before proposed, to the Gulf of Akaba. But we said that the government of this lower part of Syria could only be given to Mehemet Ali for his life; and that neither England nor Austria could consent to recommend the grant of hereditary tenure to Mehemet Ali, in regard to any part whatever of Syria; and I stated, moreover, to M. Guizot, that this proposal was the utmost extent to which we could go in the way of concession, in order to obtain the co-operation of France; and that it was, therefore, our last offer.

"The Baron Nieumann and myself made this communication to M. Guizot separately; Baron de Nieumann on one day, and I upon the next. M. Guizot told me he would report to his government the proposition I had made, and the statements with which I accompanied it, and would let me know their reply whenever he should receive it.

"Soon afterwards, the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, stated to me, that they had reason to believe that the French Government, instead of deciding upon this proposition themselves, had transmitted it to Alexandria for the decision of Mehemet Ali. That this was placing the four powers in negotiation, not with France, but with Mehemet Ali. That, besides the delay which would be thereby occasioned, this was what their respective courts neither intended to do, nor could consent to do; and that the French Government had thus placed the plenipotentiaries in a very embarrassing situation. I replied that I agreed with them in all their objections to the step which they believed the French Government to have taken, but that M. Guizot had said nothing to me as to any reference made, or to be made, to Mehemet Ali; that the French Government was then much occupied by parliamentary affairs, and might naturally require some time to give us its answer to our proposal, and that no great practical inconvenience could arise from some trifling delay in this matter. Towards the end of June, I think it was on the 27th of that month, M. Guizot came to me, and read to me, from a letter addressed to him by M. Thiers, the answer of the French Government to our proposal. This answer was a positive refusal. M. Thiers stated, 'That the French Government knew for certain that Mehemet Ali *would not consent to any division of Syria*, unless compelled thereto by force. That France could not co-operate in the employment of force against Mehemet Ali for such a purpose: and, therefore, France could not be a party to the proposed arrangement.'

"France having thus refused the *ultimatum* of the British Government, it became necessary for the plenipotentiaries of the four powers to consider what course their governments should then pursue.

"The position of the five governments was this:—All five had declared their conviction that it was essential for the balance of power, and for the preservation of the peace of Europe, that the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire under its present dynasty should be maintained; and all five had pledged themselves to employ all

their means of action and influence, to maintain that integrity and independence. But France, on the one hand contended that the best way to maintain the independence and integrity of the Turkish empire, was to leave the Sultan to the mercy of Mehemet Ali, and to advise the Sultan to submit to any terms which Mehemet Ali might determine to insist upon as a *sine qua non* of peace ; while the four powers, on the other hand, considered that the further continuance of the present state of military occupation of the Sultan's provinces by Mehemet Ali, would be destructive of the integrity of the Turkish empire, and fatal to its independence. They thought, therefore, that it was necessary to confine Mehemet Ali within narrower limits.

" France, after nearly two months' deliberation, had not only refused to agree to the plan proposed by the four powers as an *ultimatum* of concession on their part, but had again declared that she could be no party to any arrangement to which Mehemet Ali should not, of his own accord, and without coercion, consent. The four powers, therefore, had no other alternative, but either to adopt the principle of settlement pressed upon them by France, and which consisted in recommending to the Sultan entire submission to the demands of Mehemet Ali, or else to act upon their own principle, which was, that Mehemet Ali should be compelled to agree to some arrangement consistent in its form with the rights of the Sultan, and compatible in its substance with the integrity of the Turkish empire. By the first course, the co-operation of France would have been obtained ; by the second course that co-operation must be foregone.

" The earnest desire of the four powers for the co-operation of France, had been sufficiently manifested by the persevering efforts they had made to obtain it during many months of negotiation. They well knew its value, not only in regard to the particular object at present in view, but with reference to the general and permanent interests of Europe ; but that which they wanted, and that which they valued, was the co-operation of France for the purposes of peace ; for the attainment of future security to Europe ; for the practical execution of princi-



ples, which all the five powers had concurred in declaring. They valued the co-operation of France, not for its own sake alone, nor for the advantage and convenience of the moment, but for the good it was to accomplish, and for the future consequences that were to result from it. They were anxious to co-operate with France in doing good ; but they were not prepared to co-operate with France to do evil. Therefore, believing, as they did, that the policy recommended by France was injudicious, was unjust towards the Sultan, was pregnant with future dangers to Europe, was at variance with the public engagements of the five powers, and inconsistent with the principles which the five powers had deliberately professed, the four powers felt that they could not make the sacrifice which was required at their hands, as the price of the co-operation of France ; if indeed that can be called co-operation, which was to consist in letting events take their own course. Unable, therefore, to adopt the views of France, the four powers determined to carry into execution their own.

"But this determination had not been unforeseen ; nor had its probability been concealed from France.

"On the contrary, at various times during the negotiation, and as early as October last, I had stated to the French ambassador at this court, that our desire to remain united with France on these matters must have a limit ; that we were anxious to go forward with France, but that we were not prepared to stand still with France ; and that if France could not find the means of coming to a common understanding with the four powers, she must not be surprised if the four powers were to come to an understanding together, and were to act without her.

"To this Count Sebastiani replied, that he foresaw that we should do so, and that he would foretell the result. That we should try to accomplish our own arrangement without the participation of France, and that we should find our means insufficient ; that France would remain a perfectly quiet and passive spectator of events ; that after a year, or a year and a half, of unsuccessful efforts, we should acknowledge that we had failed, and should then address ourselves to France ; and that France, as friendly after our failure as she had been before our attempt, would

give her good offices to arrange matters, and would probably persuade us then to agree to things which we declined to consent to now.

"Similar intimations were also made to M. Guizot, as to the course which the four powers would probably pursue, if they should be unable to come to an agreement with France. Therefore, the French Government, having declined the *ultimatum* of the four powers, and having, in declining it, again laid down a principle of conduct which it knew that the four powers could not adopt, the principle, namely, that no settlement ought to be made between the Sultan and his subject, except upon such conditions as the subject might choose spontaneously to accept, or, in other words, to dictate—the French Government must have been prepared to see the four powers determined to act without France; and the four powers, in determining so to do, could not justly be represented as separating themselves from France, or as excluding France from the settlement of a great European affair. On the contrary, it was France who separated herself from the four powers. For it was France who had laid down for herself a principle of action which rendered her co-operation with the four powers impossible.

"And here, without wishing to indulge in controversial observations on the past, I feel it indispensably necessary to remark that this voluntary separation of France from the four powers was not merely evinced by the course of the negotiations in London, but, unless her Majesty's Government has been greatly misinformed, it had also taken place in a still more decided manner by the course of the negotiations at Constantinople.

"The five powers had, by the collective note, which was presented to the Porte on the 27th of July, 1839, by their representatives at Constantinople, declared to the Sultan that their union was assured; and they had requested him to abstain from any direct negotiation with Mehemet Ali, and to make no arrangement with the Pacha without the concurrence of the five powers. And yet, her Majesty's Government have good reason to believe that, for many months past, the French representative at Constantinople *has*, with respect to the matters to which that note



referred, distinctly separated France from the other four powers, and has earnestly and repeatedly pressed the Porte to negotiate directly with Mehemet Ali, and to make an arrangement with the Pacha, not only without the concurrence of the other four powers, but under the single mediation of France, and according to the particular views of the French Government. It is France, therefore, that has separated herself from the four powers, and not the four powers that have separated themselves from France.

“ With respect to the course pursued by Great Britain, the French Government must admit that the views and opinions of her Majesty’s Government upon the affairs of the Levant have never, from the commencement of these negotiations, varied in the slightest degree, except in as far as her Majesty’s Government has offered to modify those views and opinions for the purposes of obtaining the co-operation of France ; and those views and opinions have at all times been frankly and unreservedly explained to the French Government, and have been most earnestly and constantly pressed upon that Government by arguments which, to her Majesty’s Government, appeared to be conclusive.

“ In the early stages of the negotiation, the declarations of principle made by the Government of France, led her Majesty’s Government to imagine that the two Governments could not but agree as to the means of carrying their common principles into execution. If the intentions and opinions of the French Government upon the means of execution differed, even in the onset of the negotiations, from those of the British Government, then France has no right to represent as an unexpected schism between England and France, a difference which the French Government knew all along to exist. If the intentions and opinions of the French Government as to the means of execution have undergone a change since the negotiations began, then France has no right to impute to Great Britain a divergence of policy, which arises from a change on the part of France, and not from a change on the part of Great Britain. But in any case, when four out of the five powers found themselves agreed upon one course, and

when the fifth had determined to pursue a course entirely different, it could not reasonably be expected that the four should, in deference to the fifth, give up opinions in which they were daily more and more confirmed, and which related to a matter of vital importance to the great and permanent interests of Europe.

"But as France still holds to the general principles which she declared at the outset, and still affirms that she considers the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire under its present dynasty, necessary for the preservation of the balance of power and for the security of peace; as France has never denied that the arrangement which the four powers intend to effect between the Sultan and the Pacha, would, if it could be executed, be the most complete and the best; and as the objections of France have applied not to the end in view, but to the means by which that end is to be accomplished, her opinion being that the end was good, but the means insufficient or dangerous, her Majesty's Government trust that the separation of France from the other four powers, which her Majesty's Government most deeply regret, cannot be of long duration.

"For when the four shall, in conjunction with the Sultan, have brought about such an arrangement between the Porte and its subject, as may be compatible with the integrity of the Ottoman empire, and with the future peace of Europe, there will no longer remain any point of difference between France and the allies; and there can then be nothing to prevent France from concurring with the four powers in such further engagements for the future as may appear to be necessary, in order to give due stability to the good effects of the interposition of the four powers in favour of the Sultan, to secure the Ottoman empire from a recurrence of danger.

"Her Majesty's Government will look forward with eagerness to the moment when France will thus be at liberty again to take her place in the union of the five powers; and her Majesty's Government hopes that the arrival of that moment will be hastened by the full exertion of the moral influence of France. Although the French Government has, for reasons of its own, declined

to take part in measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali, surely that Government cannot object to employ its means of persuasion to induce the Pacha to submit to the arrangements which are to be proposed to him; and it is obvious, that there are many topics which might be urged, and many prudential considerations which might be pressed upon the Pacha with more effect by France, as a neutral power, taking no part in those affairs, than by the four powers, who are actively engaged in executing the measures of coercion.

"But be this as it may, her Majesty's Government feels confident that Europe will acknowledge the integrity of purpose which has actuated the four powers on this occasion; for their object is disinterested and just. They look to reap no selfish advantage from the engagements which they have contracted; they seek to establish no exclusive influence, and to make no territorial acquisition; and the ends they aim at must be as beneficial to France as to themselves, because France, like themselves, is interested in the maintenance of the balance of power, and in the preservation of general peace.

"You will transmit officially to M. Thiers a copy of this despatch.—I am, &c.,

(Signed)

"PALMERSTON."

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REPLY OF M. THIERS TO THE MEMORANDUM  
OF LORD PALMERSTON, OF AUG. 30.

*"The President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
to the Ambassador of France in London.*

*"Paris, Oct. 3, 1840.*

MONSIEUR L'AMBASSADEUR.—You have had cognizance of the despatch written by Lord Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer, in order to explain the conduct of the British Government in the important negotiation which terminated by the treaty of the 15th July. This despatch, the perfectly appropriate and moderate tone of which I acknowledge



with pleasure, contains, nevertheless, assertions and arguments which the Government of the King cannot allow to be established. Doubtless, not to aggravate a situation already so menacing, it would be preferable to leave the past in oblivion, and not to revert to contestations too frequently renewed; but Lord Palmerston would have the right of complaining, if no answer was given to his communication; and, moreover, it is important to represent, in its real light, the respective conduct of every court during this important negotiation. The despatch of Lord Palmerston, communicated to all the legations, under the form of printed copies, has already become public. It was, therefore, essential to give it a reply. The one I send you, and of which I trust that the British Cabinet will have no reason to complain, will give to the facts which have occurred between the different Cabinets the real sense which to us they seem to have. You will have the goodness to send a copy of this to the secretary of state of her Britannic Majesty.

“If I have rightly seized the meaning of the *exposé* presented by Lord Palmerston, it may be resumed as follows :—

“Great Britain, completely disinterested in the eastern question, has pursued but one end—viz., the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire. This is the end she proposed to all the courts, the end they all adopted and pursued, France as well as the others. In this end it was requisite to reduce to smaller proportions the immense pretensions of the Viceroy of Egypt; it was necessary to remove, as far as possible from the Taurus, the possessions and the armies of that ambitious vassal. The best thing that could be done was to place the Desert between the Sultan and the Pacha, to reduce Mehemet Ali to Egypt, and to restore Syria to the Sultan Abdul Medjid. The Desert of Syria would then have served as a barrier between the two states, and would have tranquillized the Ottoman empire, and Europe, interested in the safety of that empire against the ambition of the Egyptian family.

“This is what England has proclaimed at every period of the negotiation. France, by the collective note signed at Constantinople, on the 27th of July 1839; by a circu-

lar addressed on the 17th of the same month to all the courts, had seemed to adhere to the common principle, in proclaiming, in a manner as absolute as the other Cabinets, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire.

“‘ Nevertheless she afterwards departed from this principle by demanding, on behalf of the Viceroy of Egypt, a dismemberment of the empire, incompatible with its existence. Desirous of securing the adhesion of France, the four powers that signed the treaty repeatedly endeavoured to induce her to enter into their views. They even made considerable sacrifices for that purpose, for they added to Egypt, granted for ever, the Pachalic of Acre, with the exception of the fortress of that name, and even afterwards consented to join to the preceding the fortress itself. But all these sacrifices remained without effect. France persisted in departing from the principle which the five Cabinets had judged fit to proclaim in common.

“‘ The other courts have not been able to follow her in this proceeding. However desirous they may have been to secure her adhesion, they thought it their duty at last to separate from her, and sign an act which should not surprise her, as she had been more than once warned that, if no agreement could be obtained, it would become necessary to solve between four the question that could not be solved between five.

“‘ In fact, Lord Palmerston had carefully repeated to the ambassador of France that the proposition contained even in the treaty of the 15th July was his *ultimatum*, and that, if that proposition was refused, he would not make another. It became necessary to proceed, and not to allow the Ottoman empire to perish through too long hesitations. The other courts cannot be accused of having wished to offend France on this occasion. Four Cabinets agreed on a question of the highest importance, could not indefinitely sacrifice to a fifth their entirely disinterested views and intentions.

“‘ Besides, in acting thus, the four Cabinets recollected that France had, in September 1839, by the organ of her ambassador in London, proposed a plan of arrangement



founded nearly on the same basis as the treaty of the 15th July ; that later, in combating the project presented by England, she had acknowledged that the difficulty and danger of the means of execution apart, it would be incontestibly preferable to every other ; that, in short, on every occasion she had manifested the intention of placing no impediment against those means of execution. They therefore naturally thought that if, for particular considerations, she refused to join them in forcible measures against Mehemet Ali, she would in nowise impede their efforts, and would even second them, by employing her moral influence at Alexandria. The four Cabinets still hope that, when the treaty of the 15th July shall have been executed, France will again join them in order to settle in a definitive manner the maintenance of the Ottoman empire.

"This is, if I mistake not, the exact and rigorous analysis of the *exposé* which Lord Palmerston, and the four courts in general, continue to make of the negotiations to which the Turco-Egyptian question has given rise.

"According to the *exposé*,

"France has been inconsistent ;

"She was desirous of, and is no longer desirous of, the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire ;

"The four courts have made repeated sacrifices to her views ;

"They have finished by presenting her an *ultimatum*, founded on a former proposition from her own ambassador ;

"They did not proceed until after that *ultimatum* had been refused ;

"They have reason to be surprised at the manner in which France received the treaty of the 15th of July, for according to her own declarations it was natural to expect that she would give to this treaty more than a passive adhesion, and at least her moral influence.

"The exact account of facts will give a complete answer to this manner of presenting the negotiations.

"When the Porte, ill-advised, renewed its hostilities against the Viceroy, and lost at once its army and its fleet ; when to all those losses was added the death

of the Sultan Mahmoud, what was the fear of England and of France, then perfectly united? Their fear was to see Ibrahim, victorious, cross the Taurus, threaten Constantinople, and bring the Russians, on the instant, into the capital of the Ottoman empire. This uneasiness was entertained by every enlightened mind in Europe.

"What were the propositions of Lord Palmerston on this subject? A first time in his own name, a second time in the name of his Cabinet, he proposed to France to join two fleets—one English, the other French—to direct them towards the coasts of Syria; to address a summons to the two belligerent parties, in order to compel them to suspend hostilities; to support the summons by naval means; then to assemble the two fleets at the entrance of the Dardanelles, and to force that celebrated passage by main force, if the struggle between the Pacha and the Sultan had brought the Russians to Constantinople.

"What England—and with her all political men gifted with any foresight—then meant by the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire, was, to preserve it from the exclusive protection of the Russian armies, and to prevent the Viceroy from marching on Constantinople, in order to exclude the cause for that protection.

"France entered fully into this thought. She employed her influence with Mehemet Ali and his son to stop the progress of the victorious Egyptian army; she succeeded therein: and to provide against the more serious danger of seeing the Russian armies in Constantinople, she proposed, before forcing the Dardanelles, a previous measure—viz., that of requesting the Porte to allow the entrance of the two fleets, in case a corps of Russian troops should cross the Bosphorus.

"England acceded to these propositions, and the two Cabinets were perfectly agreed. The words 'independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire,' did not then mean (and attention cannot be too much directed to this) that Mehemet Ali should be deprived of such and such parts of the countries he occupied, but that he should be prevented from marching on the capital of the empire, and

from attracting, by the presence of Egyptian soldiers, the presence of Russian soldiers.

"The Secretary of State of her Britannic Majesty, conversing on this subject with M. de Bourqueney on the 25th May and 20th June, acknowledged that there existed in France and in England, an opinion favourable to the Egyptian family; that in France the opinion was far more general; that, consequently, the French Government must be much more favourable than the English Government to Mehemet Ali; that this was doubtless a difficulty, but that it was of secondary consideration; that the main consideration should predominate over all others, and that was the necessity of saving the Ottoman empire from an exclusive protection, and a mortal one for it, if England and France did not act in concert. France partook of these ideas. Their policy had consequently a double object—that of stopping the Viceroy when, from a powerful but submissive vassal, he changed his part to that of an unsubmissive vassal, menacing the throne of his master, and to substitute for the exclusive protection of one power, that of the five preponderating powers in Europe.

"It is in this view that it signed in common the note of the 27th July—a note tending to place the protection of the five powers between the conquered Sultan and the victorious Pacha; it is with this view it addressed on the 17th of July a circular to all the courts, to call forth a common profession of respect for the integrity of the Ottoman empire; it is in this view she was herself the first to propose to associate Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to all the resolutions relative to the Turkish and Egyptian question.

"Lord Palmerston will remember, without doubt, that he was less disposed than France to invite this general agreement of the five powers; and the French Cabinet cannot but with great regret call to mind, in comparing the past with the present moment, that it was on France chiefly that the English Cabinet believed it could count for assuring the safety of the Turkish empire.

"No one then thought that the integrity of the Ottoman empire consisted in the limit which separated in Syria the possessions of the Sultan and the Viceroy. All the world



agreed in placing it on a twofold fact—to prevent Ibrahim from menacing the capital; and preventing the Russians from succouring it. France partook with the other Cabinets this opinion, and she has remained faithful to it since.

“Austria and Prussia adhered to the views of France and England. The court of Russia refused to take part in the conferences which were to be held at Vienna, with the end of generalising the European protectorate of the Sultan. She did not partake of the anxiety of the western powers to meddle in the affairs of the East. ‘The Emperor,’ said M. Nesselrode, in a despatch written the 6th August, 1839, to M. Medem, and communicated officially to the French Government—‘the Emperor does in no way despair of the safety of the Porte, provided that the powers of Europe know how to respect its repose, and that by a foolish agitation they do not finish by enfeebling that which they seek to strengthen.’ The court of Russia then thought it very inconvenient to interpose between the Sultan and the Pacha; believing that it was sufficient to prevent the Viceroy threatening Constantinople; and it appeared to regard a direct arrangement as the least advisable resource in that situation. Besides, said M. de Nesselrode, to the ambassador of France, in the commencement of August, 1839—‘A little more, or a little less of Syria given or taken from the Pacha, affects us but little; our only condition is, that the Porte shall be free in the consent which it may give.’

“At this period, then, the four courts, who have since signed the treaty of the 15th of July—the four courts were not united in opinion, as it is sought to make believe, to-day, in presence of France, the only dissident, and preventing all accord by her perpetual refusals.

“The danger was postponed when Ibrahim suspended his victorious march—two belligerent parties were in presence—the Pacha all-powerful, the Sultan conquered, and without resources, but both motionless—thanks to the intervention of France. The British Cabinet proposed to force the Turkish fleet from the hands of Mehemet Ali. France refused, fearing to provoke new hostilities. Then commenced the unhappy difference which has separated France from England, and which must for ever be regretted

in the interests of peace and the civilisation of the world. The bad dispositions of the British Cabinet against the Viceroy of Egypt broke forth with greater vivacity—France tried to soothe them. The British Cabinet, on the representation of France, perceiving the danger of brute force, gave up the idea of recovering the Turkish fleet by violent means. This proposition was not followed up.

“It became necessary still further to explain, for the purpose of knowing in what manner the territorial question between the Sultan and the Viceroy could be settled. The difference between the views of France and of England broke forth more strongly. Lord Palmerston declared that in his eyes the Viceroy ought to receive Egypt hereditarily, but that for the price of his heirship, he should abandon immediately the holy cities, the isle of Candia, the district of Adana, and all Syria. He then consented to modify a little these views, and to join to the hereditary possession of Egypt the possession (also hereditary) of the Pachalic of Acre, with the exception of the fortress of Acre itself.

“France did not admit these propositions. She judged that the Viceroy, conqueror of the Sultan at Nezib, without having been the aggressor, having still farther consented to stop when he could have fallen upon the empire and overthrown the sceptre of the Sultan, merited more consideration. She thought that with the powers who engaged the Pacha in 1833 to accept the conditions of Kutaiah, there would be very little equity in imposing upon him more rigorous conditions, when he had done nothing to lose the benefit of that transaction. She believed that after taking from him the holy cities, the island of Candia, the district of Adana, an offensive position, and which, restored to the Porte, gave to the latter a full security, the hereditary possession of Egypt and of Syria should be preserved to the Viceroy. The victory of Nezib, gained without aggression on his part, might alone have secured for him the heirship of his possessions from the Nile to the Taurus; but in considering the victory of Nezib as nought (*non avenue*), in making Mehemet Ali purchase the heirship at the price of a part of his actual possessions, there was at least strict justice in not taking from him



more than Candia, Adana, and the holy cities. Besides, France asked how Mehemet Ali was to be reduced? Without doubt all the European Cabinets were strong against him when he sought to menace Constantinople; in this case the fleets in the Sea of Marmora sufficed to stop him; but to deprive him of Syria, where were the means?—Means little efficacious, such as a blockade not very legitimate—such as provocations to insurrection—and, most dangerous and most contrary to the end proposed—that of a Russian army. France proposed, then, in 1839, to give to the Viceroy the heirship of Egypt and the heirship of Syria.

“Never, in any period of the negotiation, did France propose anything else, except in these latter times, when she advised the Viceroy to be content with the life possession of Syria. I have examined the despatches anterior to my administration, and I cannot see anywhere that General Sebastiani had been authorised to propose the limits contained in the treaty of the 15th July, or that he had spontaneously taken upon himself to propose them. I have demanded from him himself what were his recollections in this respect, and he has assured me that he made no proposition of that nature. France then proposed, in 1839, the giving to the Viceroy the heirship of Egypt and the heirship of Syria. She was unfortunately at complete variance with England.

“This variance, for ever to be regretted, was speedily known to all Europe. Suddenly, and as if by enchantment, it made cease the differences which had separated the four courts, and brought between them a sudden accord. Austria, which at first had given a full adhesion to our propositions, which on the point of notifying this adhesion to London, had, as she said to us, only suspended this notification to give us time to put ourselves in accord with England,—Austria commenced saying that between France and England, she would pronounce in favour of either of those two courts who agreed to give the greatest extent of territory to the Sultan; it is true that till then she still protested against the idea of having recourse to coercive means, of which she was the first to proclaim the danger. Prussia adopted the sentiments of Austria. Russia

sent to London M. Brunow, in September, 1839, to offer his propositions—Russia, which lately refused, as most irregular, the idea of European intervention between the Sultan and the Viceroy, and sought for no result but in a direct arrangement. Russia adhered now to all the territorial arrangements which it pleased England to adopt, and demanded, in the case of the renewal of hostilities, that she should be allowed, in the name of the five courts, to cover Constantinople with an army, while the English and French fleets blockaded Syria.

“These propositions realized exactly the combination which England had till then regarded as the most dangerous for the Ottoman empire—the protection of a Russian army; a combination to be dreaded, not by the possibility that a Russian army would be allowed to remain definitively at Constantinople, but solely because Russia, thus adding to the fact of 1833 a second fact, exactly similar, would make in its favour the authority of precedents.

“These propositions were not accepted. M. Brunow quitted London, and returned in January, 1840, with new propositions. They differ from the first, inasmuch as they accorded to France and England the faculty to introduce three vessels of war in a limited part of the Sea of Marmora, while the Russian troops occupied Constantinople. This negotiation was going on for several months, from the month of February to July 1840. In this interval a new ministry and a new ambassador were charged with the affairs of France. The French cabinet had always repeated that it did not think it just to cut off Syria from the number of the Egyptian possessions; that if it were possible, if the Viceroy consented to it, France would not be for the Viceroy more ambitious than he was himself; but that if it were necessary to take Syria from him by force, the French Government did not see, to succeed therein, but inefficient or dangerous means; and that in such a case it would isolate itself from the other courts, and hold a conduct altogether distinct.

“While the French Cabinet held this language in London with frankness and perseverance, the French ambassador at Constantinople did not seek to negotiate an arrangement direct between the Sultan and Viceroy; he did not

give—as it seems Lord Palmerston believes, without daring to affirm it, he did not give the first example of separation. Never did our representative at Constantinople hold the line of conduct imputed to him ; never did the instructions of the Government of the King prescribe such a course. Without doubt France never ceased to labour for an accommodation between the Sultan and the Viceroy, and to dispose one and the other to reasonable concessions, and thus to facilitate the delicate task of which Europe had determined the accomplishment ; but we have constantly recommended, as well the Count de Pontois as M. Cochelet, to avoid with the greatest care all that which could be considered as an attempt to set aside the other powers : and they have been scrupulously faithful to this recommendation.

“ England had to choose between Russia, offering her the abandonment of the Viceroy, on condition of adopting the proposition of M. Brunow, that is to say, the execution agreed to by Europe at the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi ;—and between France, demanding only an equitable and moderate negotiation between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali ; a negotiation which prevented new hostilities, and, as the consequence of these hostilities, the most dangerous case for the integrity of the Ottoman empire, the protection, direct and material, of one powerful state.

“ Before making its definitive choice between Russia and France, the Cabinet of London did not make us the reiterated offers spoken of, to bring us to its views. Those offers are limited to one single proposition.

“ In 1839 they gave the Viceroy the hereditary possession of Egypt, and of the Pachalic of Acre, less the citadel. In 1840, Lord Palmerston proposes to us to give the Pachalic of Acre, with the citadel, but without the heirship. Assuredly this is to take from the first offer more than is added to it, and it cannot be said that it was either a new proposition, or one more advantageous.

“ But this proposition, so little worthy the title of a new proposition, for it contained no new advantage, had in no respect the character of an *ultimatum* : it was not presented to us as such. We were so far from considering it under that aspect, that, on a hint of M. de Bulow and



M. de Nieumann, we conceived the hope of obtaining for the Viceroy the life-possession of all Syria, joined to the hereditary possession of Egypt.

"On the affirmation of M. Bulow and M. Nieumann, that this proposition, if it were made, should be the last concession of Lord Palmerston, we sent M. Eugène Périer to Alexandria, to dispose the Viceroy to consent to this arrangement, which seemed to us to be the best possible. It was not, as says Lord Palmerston, to make the negotiation depend on the will of a Pacha of Egypt, but to dispose of opposing inclinations, and bring them to an amicable arrangement, which would prevent the cruel spectacle given to-day to Europe.

"France had some right to think that so long a negotiation would not terminate without a final explanation; that the great and useful alliance which for ten years bound her to England would not be dissolved without a last effort at conciliation.

"The insinuations which had been given, and which tended to make believe that possibly the life possession of Syria would be granted to the Viceroy, encouraged this hope. Suddenly, on the 17th July, Lord Palmerston calls to the Foreign Office the ambassador of France, and informed him that a treaty had been signed the night before; and told him so, without even giving him any knowledge of the text of the treaty. The French Cabinet had reason to be surprised. It was not ignorant, no doubt, that the three continental courts had adhered to the views of England, and that, consequently, an arrangement of the four courts without France was possible; but it could not believe that this arrangement could take place without her being previously advised, and that the French alliance would be thus promptly sacrificed.

"The offer which the Viceroy made in June to the Sultan to restore the Turkish fleet, and which it was feared would give rise to a direct arrangement secretly proposed by us, and the possibility which at this moment offered to excite Syria to insurrection, appeared to be the motives which induced the English Cabinet, after a long apathy, to take a sudden resolution. If the British Cabinet had wished to have had with us a last and frank explanation, the French

Cabinet could have shown it that the offer to send back the fleet was not a combination made by France to bring about a direct arrangement, because she did not know of the offer until after it was made; possibly she could have shown that the insurrection of Syria was a means little worthy, and not sure.

"Such are the facts, the truth of which France affirms with the sincerity and loyalty belonging to a great nation.

"It results evidently—

"1. That the independence and integrity have been understood from the commencement of the negotiation as France understands them to-day, not as a territorial limit, more or less immaterial between the Sultan and the Viceroy, but as a guarantee of the five courts against an offensive movement of Mehemet Ali, and against the exclusive protection of one only of the five powers.

"2. That France, far from modifying her opinions in presence of four courts always agreed in views, intentions, and language, has constantly, on the contrary, understood the Turco-Egyptian question in one single manner, while she has seen the four courts, first in dissent, unite in the idea of sacrificing the Viceroy; and England, satisfied by that sacrifice, go round to the three others and form a union, it is true, at present very persevering in its views, very sudden, very alarming in its resolutions.

"3. That repeated sacrifices have not been made to France to induce her to join the project of the four courts, since they confined themselves to offer, in 1839, to join to Egypt the hereditary Pachalic of Acre, without the fortress of Acre; and to offer, in 1840, the Pachalic of Acre, not hereditary, with the fortress.

"4. That she has not been warned, as is said, that the four courts would proceed, if she did not adhere to their views; that, quite on the contrary, she had some reasons to expect fresh propositions when, on the news of the departure of Sami Bey for Constantinople and of the insurrection of Syria, without her receiving any notice, the treaty of the 15th July, of which she had no cognisance till after it had been signed, and no communication till two months after, was suddenly signed.

"5. In fine, that there is no right to reckon on her pas-



sive adherence to the execution of this treaty, since if she has especially insisted on the difficulty of the means of execution, she nevertheless never professed for the end, any more than for the means, an indifference which allowed the inference to be drawn that she would in no case intervene in what might take place in the East ; that far from it, she constantly declared that she would isolate herself from the other four powers, if certain resolutions were adopted ; that no one of her agents has been authorised to say a word from which it might be inferred that this isolation would be inactive, and that she always meant, as she still means, to reserve to herself full liberty in this respect.

"The French Cabinet would not revert to such contestations, if the note of Lord Palmerston did not make it imperative for it so to do. But it is ready to place them in complete oblivion, to sift things to the bottom, and to draw the attention of the Secretary of State of her Britannic Majesty to the really serious side of the question.

"The existence of the Turkish empire is in peril ; England is highly attentive to the subject, and she is right ; all the powers who are friends to peace should be attentive to it also ; but what means are to be employed to strengthen this empire ? When the Sultans of Constantinople, no longer possessing the power of governing the vast provinces which belonged to them, have seen Moldavia, Wallachia, and, more recently, Greece, glide insensibly from their hands, what measures were adopted ? Did a European decision, supported by Russian troops and English fleets, endeavour to restore to the Sultans the subjects which were escaping their control ? Certainly not. What was impossible was not attempted. The possession and direct administration of the provinces falling away from the empire were not restored to them. An almost nominal sovereignty was left them over Wallachia and Moldavia—they were completely deprived of Greece. Is this the spirit of injustice ? Certainly not. But the empire of facts, stronger than the resolutions of Cabinets, prevented the Porte from having restored to it either the direct sovereignty of Moldavia and Wallachia, or the

administration, even indirect, of Greece; and the Porte had no peace until after the sacrifice had been frankly effected. What view directed the Cabinets in these sacrifices? It was to render independent, to preserve from the ambition of all the neighbouring states, the portions of the Turkish empire which were falling off from it. Unable to reform a great whole, they wished the detached portions to be states independent of the empire adjoining.

"A similar fact has just occurred relative to Egypt and Syria. Has Egypt ever been really under the domination of the Sultans? No one thinks it; and no one would, at the present day, believe that it could be governed directly from Constantinople. This judgment is apparent, since the four courts grant hereditary Egypt to Mehemet Ali, with the reserve of the Sultan's supremacy. In this they understand the integrity of the Ottoman empire in the same manner as France; they confine themselves to wishing to preserve him all that he can keep under his authority. They wish to preserve a feudal tie as much as possible between the empire and its detached parts. They wish, in a word, all that France wishes. The four courts, in granting to the fortunate vassal who has managed to govern Egypt the hereditary possession of that province, grant him, moreover the Pachalic of Syria; but they refuse granting him the other three pachalics of Syria—the pachalics of Damascus, Aleppo, and Tripoli. They call this saving the integrity of the Ottoman empire! Thus the integrity of the Ottoman empire is saved, even when Egypt and the Pachalic of Acre have been detached from it; but it is destroyed, if Tripoli, Damascus, and Aleppo, are detached from it! We assert, frankly, that such a thesis cannot gravely be supported in the face of Europe.

"Evidently there cannot be, to give or take away these pachalics from Mehemet Ali, but reasons of equity and policy. The Viceroy of Egypt has founded an empire with genius and constancy. He has learned to govern Egypt, and even Syria, which the Sultans could never govern. The Mussulmans, long since humiliated in their noble pride, behold in him a glorious prince who restores to them the sentiment of their force. Why weaken this

useful vassal, who, once separated by a well-selected frontier from the states of his master, will become for him the most precious of all auxiliaries? He aided the Sultan in his struggle against Greece, why then should he not help him in his struggle against neighbours of a different faith? His own interest answers for him in fault of his fidelity. When Constantinople shall be menaced, Alexandria will be in danger. Mehemet Ali knows this very well; he shows every day that he is well aware of it.

"It is necessary to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman empire from Constantinople to Alexandria—it is necessary at the same time to save the Sultan and the Pacha of Egypt, the latter submitted to the former by a feudal tie. The Taurus is the line of separation indicated between them. But it is thought to take from the Pacha of Egypt the keys of the Taurus. Be it so. Let them be restored to the Porte, and for that let the district of Adana be taken from Mehemet Ali. They also wish to take from him the key of the Archipelago. Let them refuse him Candia—he consents to it. France, who did in fact promise her moral influence to the treaty of the 15th July, but who gives it all to peace, has advised Mehemet Ali to make those sacrifices, and he has made them. But in truth to take from him two or three pachalics, and not to give them to the Sultan, but to anarchy—to ensure the singular triumph of integrity, already deprived of Greece, of Egypt, of the pachalic of Acre; to call upon this integrity the only serious danger which menaces it, which England found so dangerous last year, and to prevent which it proposed to force the Dardanelles,—is an extraordinary means to provide for its great interests.

"Let us admit, however, for the moment, that the views of the British Cabinet are better understood than those of the French Cabinet, is not the alliance of France worth more for the integrity of the Ottoman empire, and for the peace of the world, than this or that boundary of Syria?

"We should not be so much alarmed for the integrity of the Ottoman empire, were no dread entertained for great changes in the territory of the world; if war were not dreaded, which alone renders those great changes possible. *Now, what is the most efficacious combination to prevent*



them? Is it not the alliance of France and England? From Cadiz to the banks of the Oder and of the Danube, ask the people. Ask them what they think in this respect, and they will answer that it is this alliance, which for ten years has saved the peace and the independence, without injuring the liberty of nations.

"It will be said that this alliance is not broken, and that it will re-appear after the completion of the treaty of the 15th of July. When four powers have pursued, without us, and in spite of us, an end in itself bad—which we at least believe and have declared to be so—when they have pursued it by an alliance, too, similar to those coalitions which, for fifty years, have deluged Europe with blood—can it be believed that France will be found without mistrust, without resentment at this offence? This would be to form of her national pride an idea which she has never given to the world.

"They have then sacrificed, gratuitously, for a secondary result, an alliance which has maintained the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire, much more surely than the treaty of the 15th of July can do. It may be said that France might make the same reflection, and that she could, if the question of the limits in Syria appeared to her secondary, yield to the views of England, and purchase, by that sacrifice, the maintenance of the alliance.

"To this a very simple answer can be given. France, once agreed in the end with her allies, would have made, not any of those sacrifices which no nation owes to another, but merely the sacrifice of her manner of considering certain questions of boundary. She has proved this by the concessions she has demanded from and obtained from the Viceroy. But she has been allowed no choice. She was informed of a new alliance, when that alliance was already concluded. From that moment she was obliged to take up an isolated position. She has done so, but did not do it till then. Since, constantly faithful to her pacific policy, she has advised the Viceroy of Egypt to act with the most pacific moderation. Although armed and free in her action, she will do her utmost endeavour to avoid grief and catastrophes to the world. Except sacrifices which would affect her honour, she will make all those she can



to maintain peace, and if she holds this language to the British Cabinet, she does so less as a matter of complaint, than to prove the loyalty of her policy, not only to Great Britain, but to the world, the opinion of which, no state at present, however powerful it may be, can despise. The Secretary of State of her Britannic Majesty has been desirous to prove the justice of his conduct; the Secretary of State of his Majesty the King of the French, owes it also to his King and country, to prove the consistency and the loyalty of French policy in the grave question of the East.

"Receive, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, the assurance of my high consideration.

"The President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
(Signed) "A. THIERS."

"PARIS, Oct. 8.

"P.S.—While writing this despatch, deplorable events have come to-day to add to the gravity of the situation. To the conciliatory advances of the Pacha of Egypt they have answered by the most violent hostilities.

"The Porte, yielding to evil counsels, has pronounced his deposition. It is not sought alone to restrain the power of Mehemet Ali; they seek to make it disappear from the face of the political world.

"If such were the serious intentions of the powers united in the treaty of the 15th July—if we are to see in what has just happened, anything beyond the *entraînement*, almost involuntary, of a false situation, of which the consequences could not be foreseen, we might despair of the re-establishment of harmony between the great powers.

"A. T."

THE END.

LONDON :

BRADBURY AND EVANS, PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS.









